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Abstract 
7KLV UHSRUW SUHVHQWV  VFHQDULRV IRU WKH IXWXUH RI IRRG VHFXULW\ DJULFXOWXUH OLYHOLKRRGV DQG 
environments in East Africa. These scenarios were developed by the CGIAR Research 
Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security in collaboration with a wide 
range of regional stakeholders. The report discusses the theory and development process 
of the scenarios, then presents detailed scenario narratives, semi-quantitative assumptions 
IRU D UDQJH RI LQGLFDWRUV DQG ¿QDOO\ RXWSXWV JHQHUDWHG E\  DJULFXOWXUDO HFRQRPLF PRGHOV 
IMPACT and GLOBIOM. The report goes on to discuss the key results from the scenarios 
and then to describe the use of the scenarios in processes to guide decision-making in the 
context of East African food security and climate adaptation.
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1Introduction
Researchers, policy makers, entrepreneurs and development practitioners working to improve 
food security, environmental health and rural livelihoods in the developing world face many 
uncertainties when exploring the future of food systems ((ULFNVHQ HW DO 00 ,W LV GLI¿FXOW 
to predict what economic, political and social conditions will be like in the next few years and 
virtually impossible to predict the medium to longer term (Van Vuuren et al. 2012). Climate 
change and variability are among the greatest unknowns, and are likely to have far-reaching 
effects on food security, environments and livelihoods (Vermeulen et al. 2012). 
7KLV ZRUNLQJ SDSHU SUHVHQWV  DOWHUQDWLYH SODXVLEOH IXWXUHV RU VFHQDULRV IRU IRRG 
security, environments and livelihoods in Eastern Africa. The scenarios are based on 
different assumptions and pathways of socio-economic and political development. They 
were developed under the auspices of CGIAR’s Research Program on Climate Change, 
Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS) (see Box 1). A number of workshops, attended 
by stakeholders, drawn from governments, civil society, the research community and the 
media, fed into the development process. Written as if the year is now 2030, the scenarios 
describe trends and events since 2010. These scenarios were translated to semi-quantitative 
DVVHVVPHQWV RI D UDQJH RI GULYHUV DQG LQGLFDWRUV DQG TXDQWL¿HG ZLWK  DJULFXOWXUDO HFRQRPLF 
models, the International Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade 
(IMPACT) (5RVHJUDQW HW DO 1), developed by the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI) and the Global Biosphere Management Model (GLOBIOM) (Havlik et al. 
2011), developed by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). The 
separate presentation of the semi-quantitative and quantitative results in this report allows 
WKH VWRULHV WR ÀRZ DQG DOVR PDNHV LW HDVLHU IRU WKH UHDGHU WR FRPSDUH GDWD EHWZHHQ WKH 
different scenarios. 
Box 1: The CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and 
Food Security (CCAFS)
CCAFS is a major research partnership between CGIAR and the global environmental 
change community. Its objectives are: 
 To close critical gaps in the knowledge of how to enhance – and manage the 
trade-offs among – food security, livelihood and environmental goals in the face 
of a changing climate. 
 To develop and evaluate options for adapting to a changing climate and to 
inform agricultural development, food security and donor investment strategies 
and policies.
 To enable and assist farmers, policy makers, researchers and donors to 
continually monitor, assess and adjust their actions in response to observed and 
anticipated changes in climate. 
The CCAFS target regions are Eastern Africa, Western Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia 
and Latin America. Within East Africa, CCAFS focuses on Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and 
8JDQGD EXW WKH PRGHO UHVXOWV RI WKH VFHQDULRV SURFHVV LQFOXGH D EURDGHU UHJLRQDO VFRSH 
and also include Rwanda and Burundi to make the scenarios useful in the entire Eastern 
$IULFDQ UHJLRQ DQG IRU WKH (DVWHUQ $IULFDQ FRPPXQLW\ VSHFL¿FDOO\ 7KH &&$)6 VFHQDULRV 
have been, and are, used to aid policy development, investment guidance, institutional 
change, the testing of interventions and guidance for research directions.
2The aim of the scenarios process has been to provide alternate, plausible, relevant and 
challenging futures in narratives and numbers that can be used by policymakers, the private 
sector, civil society leaders and development researchers to test ideas about the future and 
the strategies, technologies and research recommendations needed to deal with the future 
VXFFHVVIXOO\ 6SHFL¿FDOO\ WKH VFHQDULRV FDQ JXLGH SROLF\ SULRULWL]DWLRQ IUDPH UHVHDUFK 
questions and help agenda setting in the drive towards improved food security, environmental 
management and rural livelihoods in the face of climate change in Eastern Africa. 
What are scenarios and why are they useful? 
Scenarios are different ‘what if?’ accounts of the future (Van Notten et al. 2003). They are 
not predictions, but instead should help decision makers and researchers acknowledge future 
uncertainty and explore the dynamics of different but plausible future worlds (Wilkinson and 
(LGLQRZ 00). Scenarios guide the consideration of future uncertainties without getting lost 
in the multitude of possibilities. They present individual stories that combine very different 
perspectives and types of information, bringing diverse futures to life in the process (Kok et 
al. 2006a). 
The process of developing and using scenarios brings decision makers together to explore 
and then plan for future socio-economic and environmental uncertainties. Scenarios explore 
the assumptions of diverse stakeholders about their context and the future, and make those 
DVVXPSWLRQV H[SOLFLW 7KLV FODUL¿HV WKH WKLQNLQJ RI GLIIHUHQW DFWRUV DQG DOORZV WKHP WR 
interact, learn together and build partnerships for shared action while allowing them to plan 
beyond the normal sphere of otherwise largely unexamined and unchallenged ideas about 
the future. 
8VLQJ VFHQDULRV IRU WHVWLQJ VWUDWHJLHV DQG VHWWLQJ DJHQGDV HQVXUHV WKDW RSWLRQV DUH FRQVLGHUHG 
under several futures. Figure 1: Rather than providing a single ‘most likely’ forecast, 
multiple scenarios explore multiple concrete, plausible futures and what these would mean 
for food security, environments and livelihoods. This way, the set of scenarios engages with 
broad future uncertainty for the testing of policies, investments and research innovations. 
Figure adapted from Bourgeois et al. (2012) shows that scenarios go beyond forecasting, 
not attempting provide a single most likely future, but instead exploring different, plausible, 
future pathways. This way, scenarios help to stretch ideas about possible futures while 
stimulating consistent thinking about each potential future world (6FKRHPDNHU 1). This 
process throws light on which options are feasible under all futures and can be considered 
‘no regrets’ options, which options are not feasible under any future, and which are preferable 
XQGHU RQO\ RQH RU D IHZ IXWXUHV DQG VKRXOG EH FRQVLGHUHG RQO\ LQ VSHFL¿F FLUFXPVWDQFHV Kok 
et al. 2011). Importantly, scenarios as used in the CCAFS programme are not themselves 
about a decision maker’s choices, but instead about contextual factors that decision makers 
FDQQRW GLUHFWO\ LQÀXHQFH DQG KRZ WKHVH IDFWRUV DIIHFW GHFLVLRQ VSDFHV VHH Figure 2).
In contexts where many diverse groups of people interact, scenarios reveal the development 
potential that can be released by linking knowledge and action among groups and across 
system boundaries, and developing a shared language about the future (Van der Heijden 
00). Consulting diverse stakeholders ensures that a wide range of knowledge and 
experience is brought to the table, while all involved are able to explore the implications of 
the scenarios for their own decision-making environments (:LONLQVRQ DQG (LGLQRZ 00).
Future: broad 
uncertainty
Forecasting:
Single future
Past
Present 
perspective
Future: broad 
uncertainty
Multiple scenarios
Past
Present 
perspective
Figure 1. Rather than providing a single ‘most likely’ forecast, multiple scenarios 
explore multiple concrete, plausible futures and what these would mean for food 
security, environments and livelihoods. This way, the set of scenarios engages 
with broad future uncertainty for the testing of policies, investments and research 
innovations. Figure adapted from Bourgeois et al. (2012).
Figure 2. Scenarios as used by CCAFS focus on the context for decision making – those 
drivers of change that are outside of the control of decision makers, such as climate 
change and large-scale socio-economic drivers. The scenarios then explore what 
changes in these drivers mean for issues that fall within the decision space of a decision 
maker or group, such as rural poverty levels or crop yields. Adapted from Emery and 
Trist (1965, 2008).
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Scenarios in the CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, 
Agriculture and Food Security
CCAFS is coordinating regional scenario development and application in East Africa, West 
Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Central America and the Andean region. In each region 
it is working with stakeholders from the policy, private, media and research sectors as well 
as non-government and civil society organizations (CSOs). The scenarios build on previous 
work done by the CCAFS team and its Scenarios Advisory Group, in particular the multi-level 
scenarios work conducted as part of the Millennium Ecosystems Assessment (00).
The CCAFS regional scenarios process plays a unique role in the context of food security, 
environments and livelihoods. It helps to articulate the challenges presented by climate 
change by introducing a complementary focus on socio-economic and governance change. 
At the same time, by adopting a regional rather than a purely national stance, the scenarios 
process links different scales and integrates the needs of a wide range of stakeholders, thereby 
identifying potential synergies and trade-offs ((ULFNVHQ HW DO 00). A cross-level, cross-sector 
approach of this kind that focuses on exploring different futures with partnerships across food 
systems has seldom been attempted previously (=XUHN DQG +HQULFKV 00). 
Figure 3 shows the different phases of the process, starting with development of the scenarios, 
then their elaboration through modelling and discussion with stakeholders (including the 
PHGLD DQG ¿QDOO\ WKHLU DSSOLFDWLRQ LQ VWUDWHJLF SODQQLQJ YLVLRQLQJ DQG VWUDWHJ\ WHVWLQJ 7KH 
scenarios can be applied in many contexts and their use provides feedback that can inform, 
improve and enrich their content. 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the different phases of the process, 
starting with development of the scenarios, then their elaboration through modeling 
and discussion with stakeholders (i cluding the media), and finally their application 
in strat gic planning, visi ing and strategy testing. The scenarios can be applied in 
many contexts and their use provides feedback that can inform, improve and enrich 
their content.  
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Figure 3. The phases of development and use of scenarios in the CCAFS programme.
The CCAFS Eastern Africa scenarios and their development
7KH &&$)6 VFHQDULRV IRU (DVWHUQ $IULFD ZHUH GHYHORSHG LQ 010 DQG 011 DW  ZRUNVKRSV 
attended by a range of stakeholders from different backgrounds but with a shared interest in food 
security, environments and livelihoods (see Box 2: Many stakeholders, diverse perspectives). 
The main steps were to set a suitable time horizon and then to identify the key drivers of change. 
7KH SDUWLFLSDQWV VHW WKH WLPH KRUL]RQ DW 00 VLQFH WKH\ IHOW WKLV ZRXOG DOORZ VXI¿FLHQW WLPH IRU 
planning at the regional level while still developing fairly detailed narratives. 
3DUWLFLSDQWV WKHQ LGHQWL¿HG WKH NH\ GULYHUV RI IXWXUH FKDQJH VHOHFWLQJ WKRVH UHOHYDQW WR IRRG 
security, environments and livelihoods, and listing them according to their importance and 
to the level of uncertainty associated with them. Two drivers were considered both highly 
relevant and relatively certain over the 2010–2030 period: 
 Population: the levels of human population growth assumed in the scenarios are those 
SURMHFWHG E\ WKH 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV 3RSXODWLRQ 'LYLVLRQ IRU WKH UHJLRQ¶V YDULRXV FRXQWULHV 
(8QLWHG 1DWLRQV 3RSXODWLRQ 'LYLVLRQ 010 7KHVH OHYHOV UHÀHFW µLQWULQVLF¶ SRSXODWLRQ 
growth based on fertility, but do not include change due to immigration or emigration.
 Climate change: since climate models do not diverge strongly until after 2030, a 
1°C global average temperature rise by 2030 and increased climate variability were 
XVHG DV D FHUWDLQ GULYHU DFURVV WKH  VFHQDULRV ,3&& 00). Future rainfall, though 
highly uncertain for Eastern Africa, was not chosen as a key uncertainty because the 
scenarios focus on socio-economic change and regional adaptive capacity rather than 
being climate scenarios. Instead, increased periods of drought were assumed as part of 
the single climate scenario (,3&& 00).
Box 2: Many stakeholders, diverse perspectives
Involved in the scenarios’ development and use process were 120 stakeholders from 
.HQ\D 7DQ]DQLD (WKLRSLD 8JDQGD 5ZDQGD DQG %XUXQGL DV ZHOO DV UHJLRQDO DQG JOREDO 
actors, including: 
 Policy advisors from agriculture, environment, meteorology, and planning 
departments.
 Farmers’ organizations under the East African Farmers’ Federation.
 Private sector organizations such as the Ethiopian Horticulture Producer 
Exporters Association (EHPEA) and the Entrepreneurship and Leadership 
)RXQGDWLRQ (  /
 Regional governance bodies: the East African Community (EAC) and the Lake 
Victoria Basin Committee.
 Regional research initiatives such as the Association for Strengthening 
Agricultural Research in Eastern and Central Africa (ASARECA). 
 Regionally active Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) such as the 
Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE), the Oxford 
Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM) and Caritas Internationalis.
 Researchers from the CGIAR Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security 
SURJUDPPH DQG WKH 8QLYHUVLW\ RI 2[IRUG
 Regional media, represented by the Panos development journalism network.
 Intermediary CSOs such as the Society for International Development.
6Two drivers were considered highly relevant for future food security, environments and 
livelihoods in Eastern Africa, but with high levels of uncertainty attached to them: 
 Regional integration: Will the countries of Eastern Africa integrate politically and 
economically, or will a fragmented status quo be maintained? 
 Mode of governance: Will governance – the rules, regulations, institutions and 
processes affecting the behaviour of individuals and groups – be characterized by a 
reactive or proactive stance of governments, the private sector and civil society? 
7KHVH  µXQFHUWDLQ¶ GULYHUV ZHUH XVHG WR VWUXFWXUH  VFHQDULRV VHH )LJXUH  6XPPDU\ RI 
WKH FKDOOHQJHV DQG RSSRUWXQLWLHV LQ WKH  VFHQDULRV LQ WHUPV RI IRRG VHFXULW\ HQYLURQPHQWV 
and livelihoods for Eastern Africa +RZHYHU WKH ZRUNVKRS SDUWLFLSDQWV LGHQWL¿HG PDQ\ 
additional drivers and used these to inform different aspects of the scenario narratives. A few 
major events, principally a severe drought occurring in 2020–2022, were assumed to occur in 
each scenario to allow for comparisons to be made between them. 
The Eastern African narratives developed by regional participants ()LJXUH  6XPPDU\ RI WKH 
FKDOOHQJHV DQG RSSRUWXQLWLHV LQ WKH  VFHQDULRV LQ WHUPV RI IRRG VHFXULW\ HQYLURQPHQWV DQG 
livelihoods for Eastern Africa, and Figure 6: Cartoon representation of the scenarios, by artist 
Mauvine Were) and presented in this working report describe the effects of socio-economic 
and governance changes, their interactions with the early effects of climate change, and the 
consequences for food security, environments and livelihoods. They portray different worlds, 
each bound by its own combination of assumptions. The ways in which the assumptions play 
out are guided by the ideas of the story-writing groups at the workshops and represent only 
a selection of the many possibilities. The scenarios provide challenges and opportunities 
for those interested in exploring new strategies. Elements in some scenarios that could be 
considered positive might have negative consequences in the longer term future. Similarly, 
SUREOHPDWLF VLWXDWLRQV PD\ RSHQ XS XQIRUHVHHQ RSSRUWXQLWLHV 7KH QDPHV RI WKH  VFHQDULRV 
originated with the workshop participants. 
Figure 4. Participants in Dar es Salaam developing scenario narratives.
Figure 5. Summary of the challenges and opportunities in the 4 scenarios in terms of 
food security, environments and livelihoods for Eastern Africa.
Figure 6. Cartoon representation of the scenarios, by artist Mauvine Were
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Quantifying the scenarios 
Modelling tools have been used to add rigour to the qualitative storylines, since they 
provide the quantitative data needed to ensure the suggested outcomes and indicators are 
credible. The teams used IFPRI’s IMPACT model (5RVHJUDQW HW DO 1) and IIASA’s 
GLOBIOM model (Havlik et al. 2011). These are both ‘partial equilibrium’ models, 
meaning, in this case, that they simulate global market dynamics for agricultural products 
only, not for entire economies. Both models have strengths and weaknesses. IMPACT 
is designed to examine alternative futures for global food supply, demand, trade and 
prices, while GLOBIOM is designed to provide policy advice on global issues concerning 
competition for land among major production sectors. While IMPACT and GLOBIOM are 
JOREDO PRGHOV DV SDUW RI WKH &&$)6 H[HUFLVH WKH\ DUH EHLQJ PRGL¿HG WR DOORZ VLPXODWLRQ 
IRU VSHFL¿F UHJLRQV %RWK PRGHOV ZLOO EH GHVFULEHG LQ PRUH GHWDLO ODWHU LQ WKH µModel 
descriptions’ section.
4XDQWL¿FDWLRQ KDV VHYHUDO EHQH¿WV ,OOXVWUDWLQJ WKH QDUUDWLYHV ZLWK QXPEHUV JLYHV 
SURVSHFWLYH XVHUV PRUH GH¿QLWH LQIRUPDWLRQ WKDW FDQ EH DSSOLHG LQ WKH WHVWLQJ RI SROLFLHV 
and research recommendations. In addition, the models represent a structured set of 
assumptions that can be used to challenge the ideas proposed by the narratives and to 
make each narrative more internally consistent. However, using existing quantitative 
models also has drawbacks in the fact that the models have been designed based on 
the present rather than qualitatively different futures, and therefore there are limits 
with regard to the degree to which models can capture these futures. Also, quantitative 
scenarios of the future can easily and wrongfully be interpreted as forecasts with 
predictive value. Therefore, the presentation of quantitative results from the CCAFS 
scenarios process for Eastern Africa involves highlighting the limitations and assumptions 
of the models and showing that depending on the model as well as the scenario, very 
different futures come up. In an iterative process, the regional stakeholders challenged 
the modelling results if they thought these were not plausible from a regional perspective. 
Furthermore, the scenarios created by the regional stakeholders ask questions about the 
future that might challenge the model designers to adapt their models, creating a two-way 
interaction between the narratives and the modelling results for further improvement of 
the scenarios.
Using the CCAFS East Africa scenarios for research and planning
The CCAFS East Africa scenarios have been and will continue to be used in different contexts 
and at different levels to aid planning and research:
 Strategic planning with non-government decision makers in the region: a workshop in 
June 2012 invited representatives from civil society and the private sector throughout 
East Africa ()LJXUH  3DUWLFLSDQWV DW WKH VWUDWHJLF SODQQLQJ ZRUNVKRS ZLWK QRQVWDWH 
actors in Nairobi, coming up with their vision for East Africa in 2030, and )LJXUH  
Participants at the strategic planning workshop with non-state actors in Nairobi, 
covering the scenario diagram in their own notes.) to explore the feasibility of future 
partnerships and strategies for improving food security, environments and livelihoods. 
This workshop was challenging but successful, allowing participants to devise and test 
various strategies based on the perspectives of their organizations (see section: Using 
regional scenarios in local futures and vice versa). 
Figure 7. Participants at the strategic planning workshop with non-state actors in 
Nairobi, coming up with their vision for East Africa in 2030.
Figure 8. Participants at the strategic planning workshop with non-state actors in 
Nairobi, covering the scenario diagram in their own notes.
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scenarios process for Eastern Africa involves highlighting the limitations and assumptions 
of the models and showing that depending on the model as well as the scenario, very 
different futures come up. In an iterative process, the regional stakeholders challenged 
the modelling results if they thought these were not plausible from a regional perspective. 
Furthermore, the scenarios created by the regional stakeholders ask questions about the 
future that might challenge the model designers to adapt their models, creating a two-way 
interaction between the narratives and the modelling results for further improvement of 
the scenarios.
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and at different levels to aid planning and research:
 Strategic planning with non-government decision makers in the region: a workshop in 
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actors in Nairobi, coming up with their vision for East Africa in 2030, and )LJXUH 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covering the scenario diagram in their own notes.) to explore the feasibility of future 
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various strategies based on the perspectives of their organizations (see section: Using 
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Figure 7. Participants at the strategic planning workshop with non-state actors in 
Nairobi, coming up with their vision for East Africa in 2030.
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 Regional-level strategic planning with government decision makers: the scenarios 
have been used in a workshop organized with the EAC in September 2012 to explore 
the feasibility of policies for improved food security, environments and livelihoods. 
This workshop led to a number of proposed policy actions and collaborations that are 
currently being developed (see section: Using regional scenarios in local futures and 
vice versa). 
 Research planning and prioritization: a number of CCAFS research projects will 
XVH WKH VFHQDULRV WR GHYHORS UHVHDUFK UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV IRU VSHFL¿F LVVXHV LQFOXGLQJ 
vector-borne diseases under climate change, migration futures, futures of pastoralists 
in East Africa, future grassland expansion, and climate mitigation in agriculture.
 Exploring adaptive strategies with local communities: CCAFS and its partners have 
organized a number of ongoing strategic planning processes with rural communities 
across Eastern Africa. As part of these processes, the scenarios will be used to inform 
local-level decision making. 
 Media dissemination: CCAFS is collaborating with the Panos journalism network 
(http://www.panosea.org/) to produce a wide range of media reports (e.g. television 
news items, radio programmes, newspaper articles) that will raise awareness of the 
scenarios among a broad audience, including potential user groups. The outcomes of 
the various processes that use the scenarios will be disseminated in a similar way.
 Support for global research: the CCAFS scenarios for East Africa constitute a regional 
case study that can feed into global scenarios efforts, such as the Global Futures Hub 
organized by the Global Forum on Agricultural Research (GFAR, http://www.egfar.
org/) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Shared Socio-
economic Pathways (Moss et al. 2010). Members of the CCAFS scenarios team and 
their partners have already established links with these global processes.
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Scenario narratives
Sleeping Lions – a story of regional fragmentation and reactive 
governance
Figure 9. Sleeping Lions.
Summary
This scenario is all about wasted potential and win–lose games. Governments in 2030 act 
only in response to serious situations and in ways to further their own self-interests, thereby 
allowing foreign interests free rein in the region. Their actions – or lack of them – have 
devastating consequences for East Africans’ food security, livelihoods and environments. 
&RQÀLFWV SURWHVWV DQG XSULVLQJV DUH FRPPRQ EXW HDFK WLPH UHIRUP LV SURPLVHG LW IDLOV WR 
materialize. The lack of coordinated effort on climate change and its impacts means that 
a severe drought occurring in 2020–2022 results in widespread hunger and many deaths 
among the region’s poor and vulnerable. It is only the adaptive capacity and resilience of 
communities, born out of decades of enforced self-reliance based on informal economies, 
FROODERUDWLRQ DQG NQRZOHGJH VKDULQJ WKDW PLWLJDWHV WKH ZRUVW HIIHFWV RI WKLV GLVDVWHU 7KH ¿UVW 
signs of better governance emerge only in the late 2020s, but the region’s population still 
faces a very uncertain future. 
Governance: see nothing, hear nothing, do nothing 
Between 2010 and 2030, East African countries experienced numerous political regime 
changes. While plans for common trade and market platforms and visions for the opening 
of country borders for trade and employment were developed, no tangible instruments were 
put in place to establish a regional governance system within which countries could operate 
DV D UHJLRQDO EORF ,QVWHDG HDFK FRXQWU\ FRQFHQWUDWHG RQ WKH IDFWRUV WKDW EHQH¿W RQO\ LWV 
12
limited national interests at the expense of others. Governments developed relationships of 
FRQYHQLHQFH ZLWK LQWHUQDWLRQDO LQYHVWRUV EULQJLQJ YLUWXDOO\ QR EHQH¿WV DW DOO WR WKH SROLWLFDO 
social and economic development of the region.
%\ 0 WKH 'HPRFUDWLF 5HSXEOLF RI &RQJR .HQ\D 7DQ]DQLD DQG 8JDQGD KDG RI¿FLDOO\ 
acceded to most of the clauses governing regional economic cooperation, but South Sudan 
and Ethiopia continued to be sceptical of full integration. As of 2030, there is still no 
agreement on a common market, currency or political leader. Integration is hampered by 
FRQÀLFW IDPLQH ODFN RI UHVRXUFHV IRU GHYHORSPHQW SURMHFWV DQG ODFN RI FDSDFLW\ WR IRUPXODWH 
and harmonize regional policies. Operationally, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) are the only 
regional frameworks, but these have had little impact on economic development. One major 
DFKLHYHPHQW LV WKH LQWURGXFWLRQ RI D UHJLRQDO FRQÀLFW HDUO\ ZDUQLQJ FHQWUH DQG SHDFHNHHSLQJ 
LQLWLDWLYH LQ 0
At the same time, levels of corruption have increased, forcing governments to spend large 
amounts of public money on self-defence (e.g. commissions of enquiry and national anti-
corruption organizations) rather than investing in economic development. However, every 
newly elected government has been anxious to develop regulatory frameworks to combat 
corruption, and several countries have embarked on a process of constitutional reform. 
Corruption has been accompanied by autocratic tendencies, with ruling elites clinging to 
power – even when this affects the country’s stability – and refusing to introduce measures to 
improve democracy and governance and guarantee human rights. Free and fair elections have 
remained an elusive goal, and elections continue to be associated with violence. 
By 2030, when repeated public protests and other outbreaks of unrest have failed to lead to 
tangible change, the citizens of leading countries (e.g. Ethiopia and Kenya) have developed 
VWURQJ SROLWLFDO DZDUHQHVV (PHUJLQJ SOXUDOLVP DQG SDUWLFLSDWRU\ GHPRFUDF\ KDYH ¿QDOO\ OHG 
WR WKH ¿UVW PRGHVW VLJQV RI LPSURYHG JRYHUQDQFH LQ WKHVH FRXQWULHV VSDUNLQJ KRSH IRU WKH 
rest of the region. Political parties are now more powerful, with politics dominated less by 
idiosyncratic strong-men, and persistent lobbying by activists has enlarged the democratic 
space. However, old habits still curtail administrative openness, institutional accountability 
and hence economic development. A few good national policies, often driven by donor 
agendas, have attempted to address poverty, agricultural development and environmental 
protection, but political incompetence and vested interests have prevented their full 
implementation. 
Power struggles at the regional level and unilateralist approaches within countries have 
XQGHUPLQHG WKH UHJLRQ¶V HFRQRPLF JURZWK 'HVSLWH LQWHUYHQWLRQ E\ WKH $IULFDQ 8QLRQ 8QLWHG 
1DWLRQV 8QLWHG 6WDWHV DQG (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ WKH LPSDVVH KDV QRW EHHQ RYHUFRPH 0HDQZKLOH 
civil war continues in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and Sudan, with regional 
piracy, terrorism and kidnapping (e.g. by Al-Shabaab) increasing in the countries bordering 
the Indian Ocean. Such instability has all but prevented the free movement of people, goods 
DQG VHUYLFHV DQG DW WKH VDPH WLPH OHG WR DQ LQÀX[ RI UHIXJHHV WR WKH PRUH VWDEOH FRXQWULHV 
and an overall increase in the number of displaced people.
7KH KDUPRQL]DWLRQ RI SROLFLHV ZDV FRPSOLFDWHG IXUWKHU E\ LQWHU DQG LQWUDUHJLRQDO FRQÀLFWV 
the spread of HIV/AIDS and attentions focused on the adoption of new development 
programmes at the continental level, for example the New Partnership for African 
'HYHORSPHQW 1(3$' DOWKRXJK VRPH EHQH¿WV IURP WKH ODWWHU KDG EHJXQ WR WULFNOH GRZQ 
to relatively poor people in a few areas. Lack of positive government action led to a rise in 
the numbers and activities of regional CSOs. Similarly, NGOs – especially international and 
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regional ones – grew in power and resources towards 2030. However, these organizations 
failed to stimulate large-scale change in food security, environments and livelihoods because 
of a lack of cooperation on the part of the governments. The smaller NGOs, in particular, were 
often confrontational in their stance towards government and the private sector, adding to the 
divisive nature of the political discourse.
There are a few instances where the dictates of the global economy and global agreements on 
FOLPDWH FKDQJH KDYH EHHQ UHÀHFWHG LQ UHJLRQDO DJUHHPHQWV EXW WKLV KDV EHHQ GRQH ZLWK OLWWOH 
or no consideration for the compatibility of such initiatives with the existing regional policy 
environment. Individual countries have aimed to win concessions and access funding at the 
expense of others. While some countries have attracted strong foreign investment (particularly 
IURP $VLD DJUHHPHQWV KDYH EHHQ PDGH LQ VXFK D ZD\ WKDW WKH\ KDYH EHQH¿WHG RQO\ WKH HOLWHV 
in society and foreign companies, and have undermined local enterprise (e.g. in agricultural 
and infrastructural development). Furthermore, foreign investors have not been obliged to 
comply with environmental regulations, and their development projects have been associated 
with pollution, increased greenhouse gas emissions and displacement of people, leading to 
FRQÀLFW RYHU ODQG DQG RWKHU VFDUFH UHVRXUFHV ,Q VRPH FRXQWULHV HJ (WKLRSLD IRUHLJQ PXOWL
nationals have been allowed to convert large areas of forest for the production of biofuel 
DQG IRRG FURSV :LWK ¿QDQFLDO SUR¿WV WDNLQJ SUHFHGHQFH RYHU DOO RWKHU FRQVLGHUDWLRQV ± 
including environmental resource management – land degradation and overexploitation have 
negatively affected ecosystem health. However, local people have gained some opportunities 
WR OHDUQ VNLOOV DQG DSSO\ PRGHUQ WHFKQRORJLHV WR LPSURYH DJULFXOWXUDO SURGXFWLRQ HI¿FLHQF\ 
but mainly as workers on commercial farms rather than as traditional smallholders. In 
the meantime, the land-grabs of earlier decades have grown through deals made between 
governments and international investors.
Rising food prices have presented opportunities for East African countries to promote 
agricultural and rural development, but this opportunity has been hampered by inadequate 
infrastructure, weak institutions and lack of political will to implement supportive policies. 
Figure 10. Sleeping Lions: “While some countries have attracted strong foreign 
LQYHVWPHQW « DJUHHPHQWV KDYH EHHQ PDGH LQ VXFK D ZD\ WKDW WKH\ KDYH EHQHÀWHG RQO\ 
the elites in society and foreign companies, and have undermined local enterprise.”
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,Q WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO DUHQD D ¿QDQFLDO FULVLV LQ 01 VLPLODU WR WKH 00 µFUHGLW FUXQFK¶ RQO\ 
worsened this volatile situation, leaving many countries in debt to Asian governments and 
investors, particularly those from China.
In 2030, the regional economy is highly dependent on cross-border trade. Formal cross-border 
trade supposedly improved in 2010, with the signing of the East Africa Market Protocol. 
However, economic relationships between countries have since become more problematic, 
with poor governance and corruption at border posts leading to an increase in informal cross-
ERUGHU WUDGH DQG HYHQ WR ORFDOL]HG FRQÀLFWV EHWZHHQ QHLJKERXULQJ FRXQWULHV 
Infrastructure: foreign roads for foreign cars
Driven mainly by foreign investment, transport and communication infrastructure has 
LPSURYHG VLJQL¿FDQWO\ LQ XUEDQ DQG LQGXVWULDO DUHDV EXW WKHUH KDV EHHQ OLWWOH FKDQJH LQ WKH 
more remote rural districts. Corruption has led to the misallocation of funds, with money 
FKDQQHOOHG WR XQHFRQRPLF KLJKSUR¿OH SURMHFWV UDWKHU WKDQ WR WKH SURYLVLRQ RI URDGV KRVSLWDOV 
and schools for the broader population. There has been a slight increase in electrical grid 
capacity, but only a quarter of the population has access to electricity. 
The lack of infrastructure, particularly in rural areas, is stalling economic growth and 
widening the gap between rich and poor. In rural areas, farmers and other entrepreneurs are 
unable to compete due to lack of access to markets and high input and production costs.
Livelihoods: communities on their own
Although livelihood opportunities have improved in parts of East Africa, particularly in 
Kenya and Ethiopia and in urban centres, most people have fewer options in 2030 than they 
did 20 years earlier. Furthermore, average incomes for the poor are lower than they were in 
Figure 11. Sleeping Lions: “Corruption has led to the misallocation of funds, with money 
FKDQQHOOHG WR XQHFRQRPLF KLJKSURÀOH SURMHFWV UDWKHU WKDQ WR WKH SURYLVLRQ RI URDGV 
hospitals and schools for the broader population.”
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2010. Lack of free movement across borders prevents migration for work, while persisting 
FRQÀLFW IRUFHV SHRSOH WR ÀHH WKHLU KRPHODQGV $W WKH VDPH WLPH GURXJKW SRRU HQYLURQPHQWDO 
management and the rise of large-scale commercial agriculture continue to drive rural people 
out of the agricultural sector. Poor smallholders still lack access to credit and so are unable to 
invest in improvements to their farm-based livelihoods.
Migration from rural to urban areas has broken community ties, but in the absence of 
proactive governance, civil society and community-based self-help groups have increased 
greatly in number, in both rural and urban areas. Better communication technology, 
particularly the spread of mobile phone use, has helped these groups to function and 
disseminate knowledge, which is particularly useful for smallholders and pastoralists in 
remote rural locations. Foreign investment by the private sector has partially met the demand 
for agricultural scientists by making funds available for capacity building, but this has 
been aimed principally at commercial agriculture. Government funding for public sector 
agricultural research remains very low, despite some support from donor agencies.
Health care remains the privilege of the middle classes and the wealthy elite, with the poor 
largely unable to access health care services. Donor funds for health care have been cut in 
response to a long history of corruption in the allocation of funds. 
Agriculture: lambs to the slaughter
,Q 010 0 SHUFHQW RI (DVW $IULFDQ IDUPHUV ZHUH VPDOOKROGHUV ZLWK RQO\ 10 SHUFHQW 
engaged in commercial agriculture. By 2030, due to investment and land grabbing by the 
multinationals and by foreign governments, many smallholders have given up and migrated to 
the cities, while a minority have found jobs as farm labourers in commercial agriculture, often 
under exploitative conditions. 
Rising oil prices have prompted governments and investors to convert large areas of agricultural 
land to biofuel production at the expense of food crops, putting their countries at risk of rising 
food prices and food insecurity for the vulnerable and poor, due to the need to import food. 
A rise in the number of wealthy urbanites has created a demand for processed food. On 
the positive side, this trend has attracted foreign investment and created new jobs in the 
agroprocessing industry. But the down side is that the nutritional value of urban diets has 
fallen, with no government attempts to set matters right. 
There is no single East African voice on market access, domestic support, export subsidies and 
other pertinent issues for the agricultural sector. The lack of a regional trade policy leaves East 
African markets open to cheap imports of food and other products from China and elsewhere. 
To compete, local industries and smallholders are forced to accept very small margins. The 
absence of functioning market institutions further hinders producers, since they are unable to 
WDNH DGYDQWDJH RI JOREDO PDUNHW RSSRUWXQLWLHV WKH PLGGOHPHQ DUH DOZD\V LQ WKH ZD\ DQG KDYH 
free rein to exploit producers. However, the relentless increase in mobile phone technology does 
offset this dependency to some degree, providing farmers with direct market information. 
By 2030, governments are increasingly failing to allocate 10 percent of gross domestic 
SURGXFW *'3 WR DJULFXOWXUH DV DJUHHG LQ WKH 00 0DSXWR 'HFODUDWLRQ 7KLV LV UHÀHFWHG 
in the lack of rural transport and power infrastructure, the subsequent lack of active rural 
markets, and the underfunding of national agricultural research and extension systems. 
Increasing rainfall variability and drought have severely constrained agricultural production, 
with farmers relying more and more on simple water harvesting solutions. Few advanced 
WHFKQRORJLHV DUH DYDLODEOH WR WKHP 7KH HIIHFWV RI LQFUHDVHG UDLQIDOO YDULDELOLW\ DUH UHÀHFWHG 
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in falling average yields across the smallholder sector, while large-scale commercial crop 
production, which relies largely on irrigation, is affected less.
Between 2020 and 2022, a severe drought affected much of the region. Governments had little 
capacity to respond and, as a result, famine conditions leading to deaths from starvation and 
disease were high. The lack of infrastructure and government support hampered humanitarian 
relief efforts, particularly in remote rural areas. 
Extensive livestock producers (pastoralists) were already experiencing problems due to 
FOLPDWH FKDQJH DQG GHVHUWL¿FDWLRQ LQ 010 DQG E\ 00 WKH\ KDYH VXIIHUHG JUHDWO\ IURP D 
combination of drought, marginalization and other factors. Pressure on pasture lands leads to 
RYHUJUD]LQJ ODQG GHJUDGDWLRQ VRLO HURVLRQ DQG FRQÀLFWV RYHU UHVRXUFHV SDUWLFXODUO\ ZDWHU 
The result is a downward spiral of falling livestock numbers and rising poverty in pastoral and 
agropastoral communities. In times of drought, pastoralists must move their animals to new 
areas, often across country borders. This not only increases environmental degradation and 
FRQÀLFW RYHU ODQG DQG ZDWHU EXW DOVR VSUHDGV DQLPDO GLVHDVHV 
Food security: empty hands
Since the region has been heavily dependent on food imports, rising global prices are 
WULJJHULQJ PDFURHFRQRPLF LQVWDELOLW\ ± LQFOXGLQJ KLJK LQÀDWLRQ ± DQG OHYHOV RI SRYHUW\ DQG 
hunger are increasing among both rural and urban populations.
Government policy has long focused agricultural production on exports. There has been 
LQVXI¿FLHQW LQYHVWPHQW LQ WKH SURGXFWLRQ RI IRRG VWDSOHV WKHUHE\ SXWWLQJ WKH UHJLRQ DW ULVN RI 
food insecurity when food import prices experience a spike, as they often have done during 
years of harvest failure elsewhere in the world. This policy also discourages smallholders 
from producing food for the domestic market when import prices are low. Price volatility 
XQGHUPLQHV WKH FRQ¿GHQFH QHHGHG LI HQWUHSUHQHXULDO VPDOOVFDOH IDUPHUV DUH WR LQYHVW LQ 
technological improvements or new enterprises for food staples. 
7KH ODFN RI LQYHVWPHQW LQ GRPHVWLF DJULFXOWXUH DOVR PHDQV WKDW FRXQWULHV DUH LQVXI¿FLHQWO\ SUHSDUHG 
for the consequences of climate change. There is limited technology and knowledge available for 
formulating and implementing mitigation and adaptation strategies. The lack of data means that 
most farmers continue to rely on local knowledge. Some support for the development of climate 
risk adaptation and mitigation policy has been available from international organizations, but 
policies have yet to be implemented due to a lack of capacity and accountability. 
The devastating drought of 2020–2022 caused several years of poor harvests and the past 
20 years have been characterized by a continuous risk of famine. However, government 
UHVSRQVHV RYHU WKH SDVW GHFDGH KDYH QRW UHÀHFWHG WKLV XUJHQF\ ZLWK WRR PXFK WDON DQG WRR 
little action – no substantive policy development and no programmatic efforts to address the 
challenge, neither at the national nor regional level.
Individual countries continue to rely on food aid and development projects, which are 
implemented in piecemeal fashion with little consideration for sustainability. In response 
to widespread food insecurity, and in the absence of government action, NGOs have been 
investing in agricultural research and development, but not always very competently. 
Environments: fallow lands
In 2030, many East Africans are still living in poverty. In addition to prompting migration, 
particularly away from marginal lands and towards cities, this is placing great stress on 
natural resources. Measures on the environment have been largely reactionary and prompted 
by environmental crises (e.g. the Great Drought). 
Figure 12. Sleeping Lions: “Between 2020 and 2022, a severe drought affected much 
of the region. Governments had little capacity to respond and, as a result, deaths from 
starvation and disease were high.”
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in falling average yields across the smallholder sector, while large-scale commercial crop 
production, which relies largely on irrigation, is affected less.
Between 2020 and 2022, a severe drought affected much of the region. Governments had little 
capacity to respond and, as a result, famine conditions leading to deaths from starvation and 
disease were high. The lack of infrastructure and government support hampered humanitarian 
relief efforts, particularly in remote rural areas. 
Extensive livestock producers (pastoralists) were already experiencing problems due to 
FOLPDWH FKDQJH DQG GHVHUWL¿FDWLRQ LQ 010 DQG E\ 00 WKH\ KDYH VXIIHUHG JUHDWO\ IURP D 
combination of drought, marginalization and other factors. Pressure on pasture lands leads to 
RYHUJUD]LQJ ODQG GHJUDGDWLRQ VRLO HURVLRQ DQG FRQÀLFWV RYHU UHVRXUFHV SDUWLFXODUO\ ZDWHU 
The result is a downward spiral of falling livestock numbers and rising poverty in pastoral and 
agropastoral communities. In times of drought, pastoralists must move their animals to new 
areas, often across country borders. This not only increases environmental degradation and 
FRQÀLFW RYHU ODQG DQG ZDWHU EXW DOVR VSUHDGV DQLPDO GLVHDVHV 
Food security: empty hands
Since the region has been heavily dependent on food imports, rising global prices are 
WULJJHULQJ PDFURHFRQRPLF LQVWDELOLW\ ± LQFOXGLQJ KLJK LQÀDWLRQ ± DQG OHYHOV RI SRYHUW\ DQG 
hunger are increasing among both rural and urban populations.
Government policy has long focused agricultural production on exports. There has been 
LQVXI¿FLHQW LQYHVWPHQW LQ WKH SURGXFWLRQ RI IRRG VWDSOHV WKHUHE\ SXWWLQJ WKH UHJLRQ DW ULVN RI 
food insecurity when food import prices experience a spike, as they often have done during 
years of harvest failure elsewhere in the world. This policy also discourages smallholders 
from producing food for the domestic market when import prices are low. Price volatility 
XQGHUPLQHV WKH FRQ¿GHQFH QHHGHG LI HQWUHSUHQHXULDO VPDOOVFDOH IDUPHUV DUH WR LQYHVW LQ 
technological improvements or new enterprises for food staples. 
7KH ODFN RI LQYHVWPHQW LQ GRPHVWLF DJULFXOWXUH DOVR PHDQV WKDW FRXQWULHV DUH LQVXI¿FLHQWO\ SUHSDUHG 
for the consequences of climate change. There is limited technology and knowledge available for 
formulating and implementing mitigation and adaptation strategies. The lack of data means that 
most farmers continue to rely on local knowledge. Some support for the development of climate 
risk adaptation and mitigation policy has been available from international organizations, but 
policies have yet to be implemented due to a lack of capacity and accountability. 
The devastating drought of 2020–2022 caused several years of poor harvests and the past 
20 years have been characterized by a continuous risk of famine. However, government 
UHVSRQVHV RYHU WKH SDVW GHFDGH KDYH QRW UHÀHFWHG WKLV XUJHQF\ ZLWK WRR PXFK WDON DQG WRR 
little action – no substantive policy development and no programmatic efforts to address the 
challenge, neither at the national nor regional level.
Individual countries continue to rely on food aid and development projects, which are 
implemented in piecemeal fashion with little consideration for sustainability. In response 
to widespread food insecurity, and in the absence of government action, NGOs have been 
investing in agricultural research and development, but not always very competently. 
Environments: fallow lands
In 2030, many East Africans are still living in poverty. In addition to prompting migration, 
particularly away from marginal lands and towards cities, this is placing great stress on 
natural resources. Measures on the environment have been largely reactionary and prompted 
by environmental crises (e.g. the Great Drought). 
Figure 12. Sleeping Lions: “Between 2020 and 2022, a severe drought affected much 
of the region. Governments had little capacity to respond and, as a result, deaths from 
starvation and disease were high.”
In the absence of regional agreements on the sustainable management of trans-boundary 
natural resources (e.g. Lake Victoria and the Nile River basin), a ‘do-it-yourself’ approach 
has emerged. This has caused tension among the countries that share water resources and 
UDQJHODQGV ZLWK ¿VKHUPHQ DQG SDVWRUDOLVWV EHLQJ SUHYHQWHG IURP FRQWLQXLQJ WKHLU WUDGLWLRQDO 
migrations across national boundaries, and undermining cross-country institutions and 
collaboration. 
By 2030, changes in rainfall and temperature have led to an increase in tropical woody 
vegetation at the expense of grasslands. This in turn has led to an increase in total carbon 
storage over 2010. However, deforestation continues apace, with traditional reserves of 
mature forest particularly badly affected. 
Deforestation has been driven by the expansion of commercial agriculture, coupled with 
government failure to introduce and apply regional sustainability or environmental protection. 
These factors have also led to increased soil erosion and rising sediment loads in rivers and 
lakes. Other types of land conversion, such as quarrying and mining, have also contributed 
to soil erosion and carbon depletion. At the same time, the use of agricultural chemicals 
has risen, causing pollution and eutrophication in water bodies. By 2030, although new 
technologies implemented by governments have reduced the use of some polluting chemicals, 
eutrophication continues to increase.
Demand for forest resources and expansion of agriculture have affected regional biodiversity, 
with the loss of several keystone species. Civil society movements have put pressure 
RQ JRYHUQPHQWV WR DSSO\ WKH 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV &ROODERUDWLYH 3URJUDPPH RQ 5HGXFLQJ 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) in Developing Countries and 
increase forest cover. However, there is little collaboration between international and local 
conservation organizations. 
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Lone Leopards – a story of continued fragmentation but proactive 
governance
Figure 13. Sleeping Lions: “Deforestation has been driven by the expansion of 
commercial agriculture, coupled with government failure to introduce and apply 
regional sustainability or environmental protection.”
Figure 14. Lone Leopards.
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Summary
In this scenario, regional integration exists only on paper by 2030. In reality, government and 
non-government institutions and individuals are busy securing their own interests. In terms 
of food security, environments and livelihoods, the region initially seems to be heading for 
catastrophe in the 2010s. However, after some years, national and international as well as 
government and non-government partnerships become more active and, unburdened by strict 
regional regulations and supported by international relations, are able to achieve some good 
VXFFHVVHV E\ WKH 00V 8QIRUWXQDWHO\ EHFDXVH RI WKH ODFN RI FRRUGLQDWLRQ WKLV LV D KLW DQG 
miss affair, with some key issues ignored while on others there are overlapping or competing 
initiatives. The inability of governments to overcome regional disputes and work with one 
another becomes untenable when a severe drought hits in 2020. This pushes civil society, 
bolstered by international support, into a demand for radical change in governance. In many 
cases, the resulting change is long lasting and for the better. 
Governance: divided we succeeded?
3ROLWLFDOO\ DQG HFRQRPLFDOO\ (DVWHUQ $IULFD LV LQ D GLI¿FXOW SRVLWLRQ LQ 00 &RXQWULHV VHHN WR 
maintain the status quo (i.e. national sovereignty) in such key areas of policy as food security, 
natural resource management and livelihoods development, while forging bilateral links with 
powerful trading partners such as India and China. National self-interest trumps regional 
cooperation almost every time, particularly in relation to economic, political and military 
agendas. 
7KH ¿YH FRXQWULHV RI WKH ($& ± %XUXQGL .HQ\D 5ZDQGD 7DQ]DQLD DQG 8JDQGD ± KDYH QRW 
H[SHULHQFHG VLJQL¿FDQW HFRQRPLF EHQH¿WV RU IRUHLJQ LQYHVWPHQW DV D UHVXOW RI WKHLU DWWHPSWV 
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to increase cooperation. Nor have countries outside the EAC such as Ethiopia come under 
pressure to join or at least strengthen their ties. Although the limited regional cooperation 
HVWDEOLVKHG LQ 010±01 KDV FUHDWHG VRPHZKDW EHWWHU DFFHVV WR VKDUHG PDUNHWV DQG QDWXUDO 
resources, economic development has not followed to the extent anticipated. This is due to the 
LQÀH[LELOLW\ RI LQGLYLGXDO FRXQWULHV DQG WKH IDFW WKDW WKH\ KDYH PDGH ELODWHUDO DQG H[FOXVLYH 
agreements with the Asian superpowers and other foreign investors, rather than more 
equitable regional arrangements. 
Political divisions have undermined the collective implementation of effective regional 
policies and weakened the negotiating power of the region on the global stage. Power 
struggles among member governments for control of the EAC have further impeded progress. 
Potential new member countries, such as Somalia and South Sudan, have never been seen 
DV VXI¿FLHQWO\ VWDEOH WR MRLQ 7KH FRPSHWLWLYH LQWHUHVWV RI LQGLYLGXDO VWDWHV KDYH SUHYDLOHG 
at the expense of collective strength, allowing external agents to manipulate governments 
and play countries off against each other with regard to critical investments and policy 
decisions. International interests from the North and East have also exploited the corrupt 
elements in governments. However, both government and non-government institutions and 
LQGLYLGXDOV LQ VSHFL¿F FRXQWULHV KDYH KDG D JRRG GHDO RI IUHHGRP WR SXUVXH WKHLU RZQ DJHQGDV 
RQ GHYHORSPHQW DQG HQYLURQPHQW DV WKH\ KDYH VHHQ ¿W QRW KDYLQJ WR JR WKURXJK D UHJLRQDO 
SODWIRUP ¿UVW 
In 2020, the EAC started to implement a regional network for economic and market 
cooperation, removing tariffs on trade between member countries. However, this has failed 
to be implemented fully by member states, which have continued to act in their own short-
term interests. The supply of food products with poor nutritional value into the region has 
continued unchecked, because regional-level policies to regulate food quality are absent. 
Figure 15. Lone Leopards: “National self-interest trumps regional cooperation almost 
every time … The competitive interests of individual states have prevailed at the 
expense of collective strength.”
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The less competitive countries (e.g. Ethiopia and Burundi) are experiencing foreign currency 
depletion as investors move their funds into more successful countries (e.g. Kenya and 
8JDQGD ZKHUH WKHUH LV PRUH EHOLHI LQ WKH HFRQRP\ 
The lack of regional governance initiatives has allowed tensions to build and political 
LQVWDELOLW\ WR ÀRXULVK ZLWK VHULRXV FRQÀLFWV RYHU QDWXUDO UHVRXUFHV HLWKHU HUXSWLQJ RU 
simmering. Among the countries with more successful economies, this tension has 
expressed itself mainly politically and economically, for example through trade disputes, but 
weaker areas or countries have acted as a crucible for violence, which has spilled over to 
neighbouring countries from South Sudan and Somalia. The violent organizations that operate 
from within these war-torn countries have been exploited by different sectarian or religious 
factions to further their own goals, a bitter reality that has featured in a number of atrocities. 
The resulting instability has increased the number of internationally displaced people and 
refugees.
8OWLPDWHO\ IDLOXUHV DW WKH UHJLRQDO OHYHO KDYH OHG WR FLYLO XQUHVW %XW EHFDXVH FRDOLWLRQV RI 
local and international NGOs and CSOs have developed so strongly in the absence of regional 
structures, there have been articulate and persuasive calls for change in national policies. 
7KHVH KDYH UHFHQWO\ EHHQ UHDVRQDEO\ VXFFHVVIXO HVSHFLDOO\ LQ (WKLRSLD .HQ\D DQG 8JDQGD 
where the potential for positive change was already highest.
Even before these changes came about, partnerships between governments and international 
DQG ORFDO 1*2V DQG &62V KDG EHHQ DFWLYH LQ D YDULHW\ RI ¿HOGV LQFOXGLQJ IRRG DLG VRLO 
FRQVHUYDWLRQ DIIRUHVWDWLRQ DQG FRPPXQLW\ KHDOWK 7KHLU LQFUHDVLQJ LQÀXHQFH KDV EHHQ 
UHÀHFWHG LQ EURDG PHGLD FRYHUDJH +RZHYHU LQ 00 WKHUH LV VWLOO LQHI¿FLHQW UHJLRQDO 
coordination of resources and skills and most local and national NGOs and CSOs continue to 
UHO\ RQ ¿QDQFLDO VXSSRUW DQG FDSDFLW\ EXLOGLQJ IURP LQWHUQDWLRQDO RUJDQL]DWLRQV 
Infrastructure: tarmac here, dirt roads there 
Infrastructure development has been very inconsistent throughout the period to 2030. 
Different national policies with regard to foreign investors and aid grants have had different 
GHJUHHV RI VXFFHVV 5HJLRQDO URDG DQG UDLO QHWZRUNV LQ .HQ\D 7DQ]DQLD DQG 8JDQGD KDYH 
been improved massively, the power grid has been overhauled, and ports and harbours have 
EHHQ XSJUDGHG +RZHYHU RWKHU FRXQWULHV KDYH ODFNHG WKH ¿QDQFH DQG H[SHUWLVH QHHGHG WR 
GHYHORS LQIUDVWUXFWXUH RQ EHQH¿FLDO WHUPV
Livelihoods: it’s not who you are, it’s who you know
The Eastern African economies are highly diverse in 2030. The larger economies (Kenya, 
7DQ]DQLD DQG 8JDQGD KDYH GRQH EHVW LQ WHUPV RI GHYHORSPHQW EXW GXH WR HFRQRPLF GLVFRUG 
there has been relatively little positive spillover into other economies. Initially, there was 
little progress with regard to poverty reduction and social advancement. There was a lack of 
DFFHVV WR DIIRUGDEOH FUHGLW SURGXFHUV UHFHLYHG ORZ SULFHV DQG LQÀDWLRQ UDWHV ZHUH UHODWLYHO\ 
high, all of which led to food insecurity and malnourishment, preventing the poor from 
creating enterprises to lift them out of poverty. Large numbers were forced to rely on food 
DLG 0HDQZKLOH WKH ZHDOWK\ KDG VXI¿FLHQW JRRG TXDOLW\ IRRG DQG FRXOG DIIRUG WR SD\ IRU 
electricity and clean water. Education and welfare have stagnated, except where it is in the 
interests of the private sector to deliver services to their employees and customers. Gaps 
EHWZHHQ ULFK DQG SRRU DQG EHWZHHQ UXUDO DQG XUEDQ GZHOOHUV KDYH ZLGHQHG VLJQL¿FDQWO\ %\ 
2030, thanks to long-running support programmes implemented with government support 
by NGOs and CSOs, the income gap has closed in some countries (e.g. Kenya, Rwanda and 
8JDQGD ,Q RWKHUV WKH VXFFHVV RI VXFK LQLWLDWLYHV KDV EHHQ OHVV FOHDUFXW 2YHUDOO WKHUH DUH 
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many local success stories, but millions of urban and rural poor remain excluded from the 
EHQH¿WV RI HFRQRPLF JURZWK 
Initially, weak government support for health-care facilities meant that the middle classes 
were more or less unable to afford health care. CSOs later pushed such governments as 
.HQ\D DQG 8JDQGD LQWR DFWLRQ DQG (WKLRSLD DQG %XUXQGL KDYH GHYHORSHG DOWHUQDWLYH VXSSRUW 
structures to raise funds for health insurance. 
Coalitions of governments, local and international NGOs and CSOs have made a concerted 
effort to harness information and communication technology and the dissemination of 
knowledge in rural areas. Kenya leads the way in this and there has been some exchange 
of lessons from this country among international NGOs, despite national distrust and 
competitiveness. Ethiopia has been less successful, due to the government’s struggles to get 
the appropriate next-generation infrastructure funded and installed. 
*RYHUQPHQWV FRPSHWH WR UHDFK DJUHHPHQWV ZLWK IRUHLJQ LQYHVWRUV WKDW ZLOO EHQH¿W QDWLRQDO 
development and job creation, with many examples of success as well as a few disasters 
scattered across different countries and sectors. The less successful efforts have often been 
associated with corrupt politicians. Meanwhile, workers try to migrate to the more successful 
economies, but borders are generally tight. Illegal migration has become a growing problem 
where borders are less well policed. 
Agriculture: power dynamics in the value chain
East Africans continue to depend on agriculture to drive economic growth and provide 
livelihoods, but the proportion of people employed in the sector has fallen. The growth of 
private-sector cash cropping for export markets has created relatively few jobs because most 
enterprises are highly mechanized. Meanwhile, many smallholders and pastoralists have 
gone out of business and moved to the cities. Agricultural enterprises are sharply divided 
into commercial, hi-tech cash cropping and the production of animal feed for export, both of 
ZKLFK DUH SUR¿WDEOH IRU WKH UHODWLYHO\ IHZ IDUPHUV LQYROYHG DQG ORZLQSXW FURS DQG OLYHVWRFN 
production on marginal land, which are scarcely viable and practised by the many, mainly 
for local consumption. Collaborative research on drought-tolerant maize was strengthened 
by using a networking approach, but was slow to get off the ground because national 
governments refused to support the network.
Expansion of the commercial farming sector led to the widespread adoption of new 
technologies and greater application of inputs, including fertilizers and irrigation, but few 
EHQH¿WV IRU VPDOOKROGHUV &RQWUDFW IDUPLQJ IRU FDVK H[SRUW FURSV HJ ÀRZHUV VXJDUFDQH 
SLQHDSSOH DQG FLWUXV JUHZ GUDPDWLFDOO\ EXW WKLV EHQH¿WHG RQO\ D IHZ ODUJHVFDOH IDUPHUV
Before the drought, food crops such as maize were generally sold soon after harvest, 
when prices were low but farmers were desperate for cash. They were bought mainly by 
businessmen, who held the grain in store and sold it back to farmers at a higher price during 
the dry season. Traders also sold staples across borders, earning themselves handsome 
SUR¿W PDUJLQV WKDW ZHUH QRW VKDUHG ZLWK IDUPHUV 5HJLRQDO DQG JOREDO PDUNHW DFFHVV IHOO 
increasingly into the hands of a few large players at the expense of smallholders. The 
middleman reigned supreme. 
However, by the mid-2020s, after the devastating drought, broad coalitions of government 
and NGOs emerged and began providing increased support for the diminishing number 
of smallholders. In addition to offering direct support for agricultural development, these 
coalitions tackled inequalities in value chains, sometimes successfully and sometimes not. 
Improved communication technology, especially mobile phones, was a key factor in the 
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successful outcomes, especially in the more remote areas where they proved indispensable in 
linking farmers with buyers and with new forms of support, such as banking services. 
7KH GRPLQDQFH RI IRUHLJQ SRZHUV LQ WKH UHJLRQ¶V DJULFXOWXUDO V\VWHPV LQÀXHQFHG WKH LQLWLDO 
focus of knowledge development on high-input agriculture, which was funded by foreign 
investors in collaboration with national governments. Civil society attempted to shift this 
balance and, by the mid-2020s, successful large-scale knowledge development projects 
KDG WDNHQ RII ZLWK JRRG H[DPSOHV LQ 7DQ]DQLD DQG 8JDQGD %\ 00 DFWLYH FROODERUDWLRQ 
between NGOs and donors, not supported but also not restricted by regional policies, helped 
secure an increase in funding for small- and medium-scale agricultural producers. 
Food security: a double whammy 
The year 2010 marked the establishment of the EAC Food Security Action Plan. It was 
envisaged that the Plan would guide the coordinated planning and implementation of joint 
programmes and projects geared to achieving and sustaining food security. However, despite 
increasingly successful efforts by a number of coalitions, most EAC member countries failed 
to achieve food security by 2030 and the EAC Food Security Action Plan is dead in all but 
name.
)URP 01 WR 00 FRPPRGLW\EDVHG SULYDWH VHFWRU FRPSDQLHV LQ WKH UHJLRQ RUJDQL]HG 
themselves to take advantage of market opportunities, but because of fragmentation and 
FRPSHWLWLRQ WKH\ FRXOG QRW JDLQ VXI¿FLHQW PDUNHW DFFHVV DFURVV WKH UHJLRQ $V D UHVXOW 
intraregional trade remained limited and people became heavily dependent on imports from 
RXWVLGH (DVWHUQ $IULFD ZLWK SULFHV GHSHQGLQJ JUHDWO\ RQ ÀXFWXDWLQJ JOREDO PDUNHWV *UDLQ 
traders in some countries took advantage of food shortages that were already emerging before 
the drought, to raise their prices, with devastating effects on the poor, who were ill-prepared 
for food shortages.
The region’s vulnerability to global markets became painfully clear when the severe drought 
hit in 2020, at a time of high food prices, causing hardship on a huge scale. However, 
Figure 16. Lone Leopards: “Improved communication technology, especially mobile 
phones, was a key factor in the successful outcomes, especially in the more remote 
areas where they proved indispensable in linking farmers with buyers and with new 
forms of support, such as banking services.”
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humanitarian aid was mobilized rapidly and effectively, since several countries and areas 
already had experience in proactively securing international donor funds and collaborating 
with international NGOs. This time, international organizations were asked to go beyond the 
initial disaster mitigation phase to help build a better food security strategy. 
,Q 0 ZLWK WKH *UHDW 'URXJKW VWLOO IUHVK LQ SHRSOH¶V PLQGV DQG ZLWK LQWHUQDWLRQDOO\ 
LQÀXHQFHG SROLWLFDO UHIRUPV IRFXVLQJ PRUH RQ UHJLRQDO LQWHJUDWLRQ WKHUH ZDV GLVFXVVLRQ RQ 
the need to establish an EAC Strategic Grain Reserve (the policy was there, but the funds 
were not). In 2030, this opportunity has yet to be realized. Instead, several larger countries 
have established their own food banks with the help of NGOs and CSOs, rather than waiting 
for bureaucrats and politicians to create a regional reserve. 
%\ 0 JRYHUQPHQWV DQG WKH SULYDWH VHFWRU LQ WKH ELJJHU HFRQRPLHV ZHUH FROODERUDWLQJ 
to promote trade with producers outside the region and value chains within countries that 
improved the availability of affordable food. However, the smaller economies had less power 
WR LQÀXHQFH WKH HTXLW\ RI WUDGH UHODWLRQV LQWHUQDWLRQDOO\ DQG ZHUH XQDEOH WR SURYLGH SULFH 
EXIIHUV QDWLRQDOO\ UHVXOWLQJ LQ JUHDWHU ÀXFWXDWLRQV LQ IRRG DYDLODELOLW\ DQG KLJKHU SULFHV 
overall. 
8UEDQL]DWLRQ DQG ULVLQJ PLGGOHFODVV LQFRPHV KDYH OHG WR DQ LQFUHDVH LQ WKH FRQVXPSWLRQ 
of processed and junk food, the proliferation of which is often supported by the actions of 
governments in building international trade relations. The increased demand for processed 
food has stimulated growth in storage and processing facilities, both as large-scale facilities 
and through the purchase and use of fridges at household level. 
Food security is linked directly to the availability and quality of natural resources – that is, 
water and soil. The initial lack of policies on sustainable natural resource management has 
had a detrimental effect on food security, but towards 2030 this begins to change, with new 
environmental coalitions stepping in.
Environments: one step back from the brink 
By 2020, East Africa’s natural resources were under extreme threat of collapse. The focus of 
individual countries on export agriculture and the lack of policies and legislation to protect 
the environment and biodiversity had led to widespread environmental degradation, species 
loss and diminishing soil fertility, amongst other indicators of environmental ill-health. 
Governments continued to ignore the need to harmonize national strategies and policies, for 
example on strengthening meteorological services, protecting water resources and establishing 
environmental monitoring networks. They had also failed to streamline strategies for adapting 
to climate change. There was considerable disagreement among countries regarding the most 
appropriate regional policies, while the adoption of national and sectoral policies effectively 
undermined regional development and weakened collective decision making. 
,Q 01 WKH ($& PHPEHU VWDWHV GHYHORSHG D FRPSUHKHQVLYH &OLPDWH &KDQJH 3ROLF\ WR 
address affected sectors such as water, agriculture, energy, transport, health, forestry, wildlife 
and infrastructure. The Policy was consistent with the provisions of the East African Treaty, 
the EAC Protocol on Environment and Natural Resources, the Protocol on Sustainable 
'HYHORSPHQW RI WKH /DNH 9LFWRULD %DVLQ DQG WKH 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV )UDPHZRUN &RQYHQWLRQ 
RQ &OLPDWH &KDQJH 81)&&& +RZHYHU SROLWLFDO LQ¿JKWLQJ GHOD\HG LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ 
LQGH¿QLWHO\
At the local level, civil society groups have been working closely with communities to 
ensure investment in the water sector. These groups have built or strengthened the capacities 
RI FRPPXQLWLHV LQ FRQÀLFW SUHYHQWLRQ DQG UHVROXWLRQ E\ KDUQHVVLQJ ORFDO LQVWLWXWLRQV DQG 
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an existing culture of dialogue. Locally, this has led to the better use of water resources, 
but because many water issues in East Africa cross national frontiers, the lack of regional 
integration still prevents the attainment of water security or sustainable transboundary water 
resource management. Some of the poorer, less politically stable countries downstream, 
including several outside the region, have suffered from water access problems over the 
past 20 years, with the economically dominant upstream countries controlling resources and 
XQGHUPLQLQJ FRPPLWPHQWV WR HTXLWDEOH VKDULQJ DQG WKH HI¿FLHQW XVH RI WUDQVERXQGDU\ ZDWHU 
resources. 
Since 2020, foreign investors have boosted the region’s water infrastructure and introduced 
water-saving technologies to areas of high agricultural potential, especially in Ethiopia and 
Kenya. A number of hydro power schemes, developed through investments by the Global 
Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Fund, have been introduced, powering economic 
development and enhancing some aspects of environmental sustainability, especially the 
UHGXFWLRQ RI FDUERQ HPLVVLRQV 8QIRUWXQDWHO\ KRZHYHU WKHVH VFKHPHV KDYH RQO\ DGGHG WR 
regional disputes over access to water and displacements due to water shortage.
&OLPDWH FKDQJH KDV ZRUVHQHG ZDWHU VFDUFLW\ DQG LQFUHDVHG WKH SRWHQWLDO IRU FRQÀLFWV RYHU 
water and land. This is exacerbated by political instability, governance problems, activities of 
liberation movements, post-election disturbances and civil wars. However, by 2030, strongly 
encouraged by foreign donors and international NGOs and with resources made available by 
the Global Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Fund, the EAC has started to introduce 
more effective regional transboundary water policies, recognizing both the urgency and the 
EHQH¿WV RI GHDOLQJ ZLWK ZDWHU VHFXULW\ RQ D UHJLRQDO EDVLV 
Fuelwood supplies have become scarcer due to deforestation, leading to a rapid increase 
LQ SULFHV DQG DFFHOHUDWHG IRUHVW GHJUDGDWLRQ 2QO\ VLQFH 0 KDYH ORFDO 1*2V DQG &62V 
begun working with national governments and global donor and development organizations 
to halt deforestation and other non-sustainable land conversion practices. Meanwhile, 
pastoralists have had to extend their traditional migrations due to rangeland degradation and 
the expansion of cropping. Their increasing need to travel across national borders has caused 
international tensions, but no effective solutions have been found. Many have become taxi 
drivers in the region’s larger cities, while others have taken other low-skilled construction or 
quarrying jobs. 
Overall, in the decade leading up to 2030, there have been a few success stories but, in 
general, regional and national capacity to respond to emerging environmental challenges 
UHPDLQV ZHDN +RZHYHU GXULQJ 00 LWVHOI WKH ¿UVW VLJQV RI UHDO FKDQJH LQ JRYHUQPHQW SROLF\ 
towards regional integration appear. After years of unrest caused in part by environmental 
degradation, governments have begun working with NGOs to develop and introduce 
sustainable development plants for the most important regional resources, including the Nile 
Basin and Lake Victoria. In Kenya, the Green Belt movement, which began as a minority 
pursuit, is now widely supported throughout urban and rural areas across the nation. Copy-cat 
movements have started in a number of other countries. 
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Herd of Zebra – a story of strong regional integration but reactive 
governance
Figure 17. Herd of Zebra.
Summary
In this scenario, governments and the private sector push strongly for regional development, 
but mainly through industry, services, tourism and export agriculture, with limited action on 
food security, environments and livelihoods. East African economies boom, but the region 
suffers the consequences of its vulnerability to global market forces and unsustainable 
environmental exploitation. Only when food insecurity becomes extreme, following rocketing 
food prices during the Great Drought of the early 2020s, is action taken to improve the 
management of water resources and invest in climate-smart food production for regional 
consumption. 
Governance: Eastern Africa as a business
The EAC in 2030 is a trade-oriented, open regional federation with eight member states 
%XUXQGL (WKLRSLD .HQ\D 5ZDQGD 6RPDOLD 6RXWK 6XGDQ 7DQ]DQLD DQG 8JDQGD $ 
common market and currency, together with improved infrastructure and harmonized laws 
and policies, have led to steady economic growth. However, improved infrastructure and 
information technology have permitted increased exploitation of natural resources, with 
worsening environmental degradation. 
In 2030, although the EAC is performing well with regard to economic development and 
trade, it has few policies in place on food security, climate change and environmental 
management. This is compromising the region’s ability to participate in global sustainability 
initiatives and is beginning to affect exports. For example, there are few regulations to 
control pollution from manufacturing and agroprocessing industries, so the resulting products 

do not meet new global standards for pollution-free products. Furthermore, international 
development partners are pulling out of the region because the EAC is failing to comply with 
environmental treaties and agreements. This is limiting the potential for market growth and 
the Community’s economy now relies heavily on regional players, especially in the private 
investment and tourism sectors. 
During and after the severe drought of the early 2020s, the region was no longer able to 
supply its export markets and GDP began to fall. In an attempt to restore growth to its 
previous levels, the regional government began to bend the rules and make exceptions for 
external investment, leading to a decline in both ethical and environmental standards. Despite 
strong regional integration, corruption is rife among decision makers and law enforcers. Those 
with power continue to monopolize resources and reap the rewards, with the poor becoming 
increasingly dependent on informal markets that lie outside the cash economy.
Infrastructure: paving the way for industry
Substantial investments in infrastructure have been made through public–private partnerships, 
leading to rapid industrialization. There is a thriving private sector, driven by domestic 
and foreign direct investment, particularly in the areas of mining, forestry, construction, 
manufacturing and tourism. Much of the region’s agricultural production is exported to India 
and China. Improvements in transport and communication have attracted foreign investment 
LQ DGYDQFHG DJULFXOWXUDO WHFKQRORJLHV LQFOXGLQJ JHQHWLFDOO\ PRGL¿HG YDULHWLHV DJURFKHPLFDOV 
and mechanization. Together with supporting regional government policy, better road and 
rail networks and other infrastructural improvements have attracted investment from foreign 
private sector companies, creating employment, new towns and industrial estates. The focus 
on agriculture as a driver of economic growth has diminished, except as a provider of luxury 
products and non-food commodities that provide opportunities for collecting taxes from new 
businesses. 
Figure 18. Herd of Zebra: “There is a thriving private sector, driven by domestic and 
foreign direct investment, particularly in the areas of mining, forestry, construction, 
manufacturing and tourism.”
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Livelihoods: a tough new world of opportunities
There has been mass migration to the cities, particularly following the drought in 2020–2022. 
However, a lack of urban planning and investment has meant the health and quality of life 
of poor city-dwellers is deteriorating due to inadequate housing, lack of clean water and 
sanitation, and overcrowded transport systems. The middle classes, in contrast, have enjoyed 
a sharp improvement in the quality of life.
Investment in agriculture has been encouraged through subsidies and tax breaks, since it is 
UHFRJQL]HG WKDW WKLV VHFWRU FDQ GHOLYHU JRRG SUR¿W GXH WR H[SDQGLQJ PDUNHWV DQG UHGXFHG 
transport and technology costs. However, the drought accelerated the already rapid exodus 
of rural people to the cities, with smallholders especially vulnerable to giving up and seeking 
employment elsewhere. Those remaining on the land have often fallen into debt, and suicide 
rates have risen sharply. Consumption has increased markedly in urban areas as incomes have 
ULVHQ DOWKRXJK WKH FRVW RI OLYLQJ URVH VLJQL¿FDQWO\ GXULQJ DQG LPPHGLDWHO\ DIWHU WKH GURXJKW 
Although wealth distribution has become increasingly uneven as GDP has risen, people living 
in the EAC in 2030 enjoy better livelihoods on average than in the past. Foreign investment, 
technology adoption, industrial production, and improved infrastructure and communications 
have all increased employment opportunities. The better educated have almost invariably 
found relatively well paid work in the cities. However, many jobs require levels of education 
that are beyond the reach of the rural poor, who remain disadvantaged and marginalized in the 
increasingly competitive jobs market. 
Private investment has fostered the development of private health care, but this is available 
only to the swelling middle classes, with the urban and rural poor unable to gain access. Due 
to a lack of government action on food security and food safety, health issues related to poor 
nutrition and inadequate food storage and processing are common. 
Figure 19. Herd of Zebra: “Together with supporting regional government policy, better 
road and rail links and other infrastructural improvements have attracted investment 
from foreign private sector companies, creating employment, new towns and industrial 
estates.
Figure 20. Herd of Zebra: “Private investment has fostered the development of private 
health care, but this is available only to the swelling middle classes, with the urban and 
rural poor unable to gain access.”
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health care, but this is available only to the swelling middle classes, with the urban and 
rural poor unable to gain access.”
Agriculture: food production, but not for Eastern Africans
In 2030, the region is experiencing strong growth in agricultural production and productivity, 
EXW WKLV LV RULHQWHG PDLQO\ WRZDUGV H[SRUW PDUNHWV 8VH RI DJURFKHPLFDO LQSXWV KDV ULVHQ DQG 
a greater area of land has been put to agriculture, with encroachment into forest and wetland 
DUHDV 8VH RI LUULJDWLRQ KDV DOVR ULVHQ PDUNHGO\ GHSOHWLQJ ZDWHU WDEOHV 0DQ\ PRUH IDUPHUV 
are working in commercial agriculture than was the case in 2010. Given increased demand 
IURP ZLWKLQ DQG EH\RQG WKH UHJLRQ OLYHVWRFN SURGXFWLRQ KDV EHFRPH PRUH SUR¿WDEOH DQG 
farmers in areas with good infrastructure are able to invest in improving their pasture by 
adding fertilizer and using irrigation. However, pastoralists in the more remote drylands have 
QRW EHQH¿WHG LQ SDUW EHFDXVH WKH\ KDYH SRRUHU PDUNHW DFFHVV EXW DOVR EHFDXVH XQUHOLDEOH 
UDLQIDOO PDNHV LQYHVWPHQW ULVN\ 7KH LQWHQVL¿FDWLRQ RI DJULFXOWXUH SDUWLFXODUO\ WKURXJK 
large-scale monocropping, has contributed to an increase in pests and diseases. Meanwhile, 
governments have been slow to introduce measures to prevent the spread of pests and diseases 
across the open borders, creating real risks of a pandemic. 
The severe drought of 2020–2022 had a devastating effect on agriculture and livelihoods, 
with a dramatic fall in food production and an increase in food prices. In the short-term the 
government was able to draw down regional food reserves to feed the hungry and keep food 
prices more or less affordable. At the same time, the government relaxed import regulations 
for food products, allowing increased supplies to come into the region. However, as the 
drought continued, government revenues fell dramatically due to the collapse of large-scale 
commercial farming and the region was forced to seek food aid. 
Many agricultural workers, from large-scale commercial farms as well as from smallholdings, 
migrated away from rural areas to seek employment elsewhere. This resulted in the rapid 
growth of towns and cities, with shantytowns springing up without the necessary supporting 
infrastructure (particularly water and sanitation). Other small-scale farmers left their land and 
tried to farm elsewhere, adding to the wide-scale environmental degradation, biodiversity loss 
and destruction of water catchment areas. 
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Food security: eating money
East African economies’ heavy reliance on food imports has left them highly vulnerable to 
ÀXFWXDWLQJ JOREDO IRRG SULFHV RYHU WKH SDVW  GHFDGHV FDXVLQJ UHFXUUHQW VKRUWWHUP IRRG 
crises. This is a problem that neither the regional nor national governments have been able 
WR DGGUHVV HIIHFWLYHO\ ,QVWHDG WKH UHJLRQ KDV EHFRPH SUR¿FLHQW DW REWDLQLQJ IRUHLJQ IRRG DLG 
quickly.
On a more positive note, strong industrial growth has raised GDP and, while little attention 
has been paid to equity and pro-poor development, the growth of regional economies has 
provided many jobs and helped lift some of the population out of poverty. However, due to 
the rising population, this has had little effect on improving food security. 
Loss of export markets during the drought led to a fall in tax receipts, so national governments 
had reduced amounts of money to spend on emergency food programmes and safety nets. 
However, the EAC government, true to its reactive governance style, mustered food aid from its 
African, European and Asian partners, who swooped in to save the day, at least in the short-term. 
Longer term responses were less effective. Despite signing up to regional agreements to 
support research oriented towards small-scale farmers, few national governments responded 
to declining food security by introducing available technological improvements. These 
included new crop varieties and animal breeds that are better adapted to disease and water 
shortages. These technologies were left on the research station shelf, just as they had been in 
earlier decades. 
Environments: wetland wastelands and savannahs full of cars
In recognition of its high dependence on natural resources for economic growth, the EAC 
formulated a regional natural resource management strategy as early as 2013. This spelled out 
the key intervention areas, which included water resource management and the protection and 
UHKDELOLWDWLRQ RI IUDJLOH QDWXUDO ODQGV ,Q 01 WKH &RPPXQLW\ IRUPDOO\ UHFRJQL]HG WKH QHHG 
to include climate variability and change in its development planning.
Despite these efforts, which included introducing policies and legislation to address 
environmental degradation, little attention was paid to building the capacity of the national 
institutions needed to implement the required actions. The policies and strategies therefore 
remained on paper. National institutions continued to focus on reactive interventions, 
working on disaster response plans instead of prevention and preparedness based on region-
wide, integrated early warning systems. Such environmental protection measures as were 
implemented focused almost exclusively on areas important for tourism, which continue to 
attract a high level of foreign exchange. 
By 2030, water shortages have become a major problem, hampering efforts to attain food 
security. Although regional legislative frameworks are in place, they are not enforced, and 
water quality and availability have suffered dramatically. In 2020, it became evident that 
most of the region’s lakes were shrinking steadily. Between 2010 and 2020, the level of Lake 
9LFWRULD IHOO E\ DSSUR[LPDWHO\  PHWUHV ZKLOH /DNH 1DNXUX UHJXODUO\ ORVW KDOI LWV VXUIDFH 
area for eight months of the year during the dry season. 
Transboundary water management agreements were discussed frequently but prompted 
OLWWOH DFWLRQ XQWLO 00 (I¿FLHQF\ LQ WKH XVH RI ZDWHU IURP ODUJH EDVLQV KDV UHPDLQHG ORZ 
At the same time, pollution is on the up as a result of increasing industrialization, use of 
DJURFKHPLFDOV LQ IDUPLQJ DQG GRPHVWLF HIÀXHQW (XWURSKLFDWLRQ LQ PDMRU ZDWHU ERGLHV KDV 
LQFUHDVHG DIIHFWLQJ ¿VK VWRFNV DQG DOORZLQJ LQYDVLYH ZHHGV WR EORRP ZKLOH GHIRUHVWDWLRQ DQG 
poor watershed management have contributed to soil erosion and sedimentation. 
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Water quality has suffered as a result and treatment costs for drinking water have escalated. 
Action has been taken only in response to crises, for example when competition for 
strategic water resources threatens to cause civil strife. Although governments have worked 
WRJHWKHU WR FRQWURO YLROHQFH DFURVV QDWLRQDO ERUGHUV LQWHUQDO FRQÀLFWV ZLWKLQ FRXQWULHV KDYH 
been frequent, with a rising number of complaints made to local governments and NGOs. 
0HGLD UHSRUWLQJ RQ ZDWHUUHODWHG FRQÀLFWV KDV IROORZHG D VLPLODU WUHQG 
Poor water management and increasingly unpredictable rainfall have reduced water 
availability not just for agriculture but also for industrial and domestic uses. Production 
costs have risen sharply as a result, forcing farmers and industrialists to invest in water 
harvesting and recycling. The regional government introduced water taxes but, as with 
many other regional government initiatives, implementation has been weak and ineffective. 
3ROOXWLRQ RI WKH UHJLRQ¶V ULYHUV KDV DGYHUVHO\ DIIHFWHG FRDVWDO ¿VKHULHV LQ WKH ,QGLDQ 2FHDQ 
)LVKHUPHQ QRZ KDYH WR WUDYHO IXUWKHU RXW WR VHD WR ¿QG ¿VK ZKLFK SXWV WKHP LQ FRPSHWLWLRQ 
ZLWK WKH ODUJHVFDOH $VLDQ ¿VKLQJ ÀHHWV ,Q 00 WKH VXVWDLQDEOH PDQDJHPHQW RI WKH (DVW 
African coastline became a focus for donor attention, in an attempt to secure the future of 
¿VKLQJ DV D OLYHOLKRRG DQG IRU IRRG VHFXULW\ +RZHYHU WKH UHJLRQDO UHVRXUFH PDQDJHPHQW 
strategy has not been enforced properly, mainly due to falling tax revenues in the wake of 
WKH GURXJKW 8QVXVWDLQDEOH ¿VKLQJ ERWK VPDOOVFDOH DQG FRPPHUFLDO DORQJ WKH FRVW KDV 
continued, leading to an alarming loss of marine biodiversity. Deterioration of the marine 
environment has also adversely affected the tourism industry due to the bleaching of coral 
reefs off Zanzibar, Mombasa and Pemba. 
Meanwhile, the region’s soil resources have been badly affected by erosion, declining 
fertility and contamination with agrochemicals as a result of monoculture, mechanization, 
improper application of fertilizers and pesticides, and reduction in fallow periods. While 
civil society and environmental organizations have forced governments to enact laws to 
protect soil quality, these have not been fully implemented. 
In the absence of government policy to protect it, biodiversity is being lost at an 
accelerating rate (except in the prime tourist areas). Many indigenous plants used as 
medicines are being overharvested, since they provide an affordable alternative to costly 
pharmaceutical products. Despite renewed efforts at enforcing regional agreements, the 
situation has not changed in the ten years leading up to 2030.
%\ 0 WKH UHJLRQ¶V HQYLURQPHQWDO FUHGHQWLDOV ZHUH VR SRRU WKDW WKH (8 LQWURGXFHG 
a ban on all EAC products that contributed to environmental degradation, ordering 
the government to take immediate action to protect the natural environment. The EAC 
VFUDPEOHG WR IROORZ WKLV UHTXHVW RQ SDSHU DQG IRU D IHZ \HDUV EHWZHHQ 0 DQG 0 
ambitious plans for more sustainable development began to be implemented. However, in 
0 WKH EDQ ZDV ORRVHQHG FRQVLGHUDEO\ $W WKLV SRLQW WKH LPSHWXV IRU UHIRUP QHYHU YHU\ 
strong, disappeared completely and the new policies are now falling by the wayside. Only 
after the Great Drought did the government start to take its watershed management policies 
seriously, organizing watershed platforms in response to the urgent need for cross-sector 
dialogue and stakeholder participation in decision making.
On the whole, however, governments continue to ‘look the other way’, resulting in little 
effective action on sustainable resource management. In the absence of government 
leadership, this role has fallen largely into the hands of NGOs and CSOs. These organizations 
typically work independently with little coordination and sometimes in competition with one 
another, so the impact of their activities has been very local.
32
Industrious Ants – a story of strong regional integration and 
proactive governance
Figure 21. Industrious Ants.
Summary 
This scenario features slow but strong economic and political development in East Africa, 
accompanied by proactive government action to improve regional food security. However, on 
the down side, costly battles with corruption continue and peace is fragile, since the region 
has to deal with new international tensions as a result of its growing prominence on the global 
stage. The region’s focus on the production of staple foods, rather than high-value crops for 
export, undermines its participation in the global market for a time, while an over-reliance 
on trade within the region causes problems when severe drought hits in 2020. By that time, 
though, many government and non-government support structures are in place to mitigate the 
worst impacts. Governments and their partners work well together and achieve some success 
in mitigating the adverse environmental impacts of increased food and energy production, 
DOWKRXJK WKH QHHG WR SXW IRRG VHFXULW\ DQG OLYHOLKRRGV ¿UVW RYHUVKDGRZV WKHVH HIIRUWV IURP 
time to time.
Governance: East Africa rising
,Q 00 WKH ($& KDV HLJKW PHPEHU VWDWHV 7KH ¿YH 010 PHPEHUV .HQ\D %XUXQGL 
5ZDQGD 7DQ]DQLD DQG 8JDQGD ZHUH MRLQHG E\ 6RXWK 6XGDQ LQ 01 (WKLRSLD LQ 01 DQG 
6RPDOLD LQ 0 7KH SHRSOH HOHFWHG WKHLU ¿UVW (DVW $IULFDQ 3UHVLGHQW LQ 0 7KH UHJLRQ 
has common customs tariffs and standards for public service delivery that enable greater 
transparency and effectiveness in trade and government support for development. Although 
not easy to establish, these have generated balanced economic growth across the member 
countries, but pockets of stagnation remain in remoter rural areas. Political and economic 
XQL¿FDWLRQ KDV DOORZHG (DVW $IULFDQ SROLF\ PDNHUV WR VWDQG WKHLU JURXQG LQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO 
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negotiating forums. In general, the quality of life for many East Africans has improved as a 
result of the larger regional market for agricultural commodities, the emphasis on value-added 
production, the production of competitive goods for international trade, and greater domestic 
and foreign investment. 
Kenya took the lead in laying the foundations for a strong and stable democracy by 
completing a constitutional review process in 2011, which made provision for freedom 
of the press, among other reforms. Other member states have followed suit. Meanwhile, 
LPSURYHG WUDQVSDUHQF\ DQG DFFRXQWDELOLW\ LQ WKH UHJLRQ¶V OHDGHUVKLS KDYH EHHQ UHÀHFWHG LQ 
more democratic elections and reduced potential for electoral disputes and violence. Further 
illustrations of the region’s proactive governance are found in the independent regional 
MXGLFLDO V\VWHP HVWDEOLVKHG LQ 01 $ GLVFLSOLQHG VHFXULW\ V\VWHP LV QRZ LQ SODFH IROORZLQJ 
D 01 UHYLHZ SURFHVV WKDW HPSKDVL]HG SURIHVVLRQDOLVP DQG RIIHUHG JRRG UHPXQHUDWLRQ 
SDFNDJHV IRU PLOLWDU\ DQG SROLFH SHUVRQQHO (QKDQFHG VHFXULW\ KDV EHQH¿WHG WKH HFRQRP\ E\ 
enabling the free movement of goods and services within the region. However, corruption 
VFDQGDOV FRQWLQXH WR VXUIDFH PRUH RIWHQ WKDQ WKH UHJLRQ¶V OHDGHUV ZRXOG OLNH DQG WKH ¿JKW 
against corruption drains funds and saps political will. Taking a proactive approach to regional 
governance has enabled the EAC to keep political instability to a minimum. At the same time, 
VHULRXV QDWLRQDO DQG UHJLRQDO FRQÀLFWV RYHU QDWXUDO UHVRXUFHV KDYH VHOGRP EHHQ LQ WKH QHZV
A further advance towards political and economic integration took place in December 2020, 
when the EAC created a monetary union using the East Africa shilling as a common currency. 
After a bumpy start, this currency proved relatively stable compared to national currencies. 
Economic integration has allowed uniform trade tariffs for imports into the EAC, resulting 
LQ D VLJQL¿FDQW LQFUHDVH LQ WKH YROXPH RI WUDGHG JRRGV )LQDQFLDO LQWHJUDWLRQ ZDV H[SDQGHG 
LQ 0 WR LQFOXGH WKH OLVWLQJ RI SXEOLFO\ WUDGHG FRPSDQLHV RQ D UHJLRQDO VWRFN H[FKDQJH 
EDVHG LQ .DPSDOD 8JDQGD %\ 0 WKH UHJLRQ KDG GHYHORSHG FRPPRQ SROLFLHV RQ WUDGH DQG 
investment, enabling the business community to take full advantage of investment from Asian 
companies. This has led to growth, particularly in the processing of agricultural outputs, as 
well as in communication and information technology. During the 2020s, trade agreements 
Figure 22. Industrious Ants: “In general, the quality of life for many East Africans has 
improved as a result of the larger regional market for agricultural commodities.”
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were signed with several fast-growing economies, including Brazil, China, India, Russia and 
6RXWK $IULFD DV ZHOO DV ZLWK RWKHU UHJLRQDO EORFV 7R DYRLG UHSHDWLQJ WKH KLVWRULF GLI¿FXOWLHV 
RI WKH (XUR ]RQH ($& FRXQWULHV DOVR KDUPRQL]HG ¿VFDO WD[DWLRQ DQG ZHOIDUH UHJLPHV WR D 
great extent. 
In 2030, citizens are free to travel between EAC countries without visas or work permits. 
The free movement of labour has expanded employment opportunities, improved household 
LQFRPHV DQG UDLVHG WKH TXDOLW\ RI OLIH HVSHFLDOO\ IRU WKH EHWWHU HGXFDWHG 8QLIRUP VRFLDO 
security policies have ensured migration occurs mostly for work. While some countries have 
JDLQHG IURP HFRQRPLF PLJUDWLRQ HJ 7DQ]DQLD KDV EHQH¿WHG IURP DQ LQÀX[ RI ZHOOHGXFDWHG 
.HQ\DQV RWKHUV KDYH IDUHG OHVV ZHOO $QG XUEDQ DUHDV KDYH EHQH¿WHG PRUH WKDQ UXUDO RQHV 
such professionals as doctors, teachers and scientists have gravitated to the major urban 
centres of Nairobi (Kenya), Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) and Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), where 
standards of education, training and health have risen sharply and investments in science 
have generated a marked increase in the prominence of Eastern African research. However, 
governments’ capacities to deal with the challenges posed by greater freedom of movement 
have developed only recently. In the early days of the EAC, the law had only limited 
penetrative power in rural areas and lacked a strong grip on issues of international security 
and corruption. During recessions, there were some ugly outbreaks of racism as people turned 
against immigrant communities. 
The importance of agriculture to food security, poverty reduction and economic growth 
ZDV UHFRJQL]HG LQ D UHJLRQDO DJULFXOWXUH DQG UXUDO GHYHORSPHQW VWUDWHJ\ ¿QDOL]HG LQ 01 
This outlines the strategic interventions needed to accelerate the sector’s development and 
includes plans for research and extension, water storage and irrigation, market development 
and early warning systems for extreme weather events and natural disasters. As part of the 
strategy, strong trade-related phytosanitary regulations were adopted in 2020. Although costly 
to institute and manage, these limit the potential for the spread of diseases, pests, viruses and 
weeds between countries and hence work in favour of regional food security. Meanwhile, 
member state governments united in voicing a strong commitment to poverty reduction as 
WKHLU QXPEHU RQH SULRULW\ LQ 0 
Infrastructure: fast train to work
Successful regional integration has spurred the development of infrastructure, with fast roads 
DQG UDLOZD\ OLQHV OLQNLQJ WKH PDMRU FLWLHV ¿UVW LQ .HQ\D DQG 8JDQGD DQG ODWHU HOVHZKHUH 
Despite protests from conservationists, Kenya’s main port has been moved from Mombasa to 
the new deep-sea port at Lamu to cope with the demand for imports. 
$GYDQFHV LQ LQIRUPDWLRQ WHFKQRORJ\ LQFOXGLQJ WKH LQVWDOODWLRQ RI ¿EUH RSWLF FDEOHV KDYH 
reduced communication costs, while regional TV stations now advertise and create demand 
for products among a wider audience than ever before. Access to market intelligence via 
mobile phones has enabled farmers to get better prices for their produce. 
By 2020, the EAC had a regional power supply grid with all major towns and cities 
RQ PDLQV HOHFWULFLW\ VXSSOLHG ODUJHO\ E\ FRDO¿UHG SRZHU VWDWLRQV %\ 00 ZLQG DQG 
hydroelectric power is also being generated. Rising demand for biofuels has led to the 
HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI SLORW ELRIXHO UH¿QHULHV LQ .HQ\D DQG (WKLRSLD 7KH GRZQ VLGH RI WKLV 
development is the need for large areas of productive agricultural land and the associated 
impact on regional food security. 
The modernized infrastructure has attracted foreign investment, with multinational 
companies from the North developing subsidiaries in the EAC, thereby boosting employment 
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RSSRUWXQLWLHV 0RUH HI¿FLHQW LQIRUPDWLRQ V\VWHPV DQG HFRPPHUFH KDYH DOVR FRQWULEXWHG 
to the region’s strong economic growth. However, while young, educated city dwellers are 
¿QGLQJ ZRUN SHRSOH LQ WKH UXUDO DUHDV DQG XUEDQ VOXPV ZKR ODFN WHFKQLFDO NQRZOHGJH KDYH 
been left behind as the ‘digital divide’ has deepened. 
Livelihoods: governance for opportunities
A large proportion of the people living in the EAC have seen their livelihoods improve 
over the past 20 years due to the growing economy. However, there is still acute inequality 
in wealth distribution. Rising land prices and the introduction of new technologies have 
prompted many to leave the agriculture sector and take up employment in urban areas. As 
a result, agricultural labour has become scarcer and more expensive. The population is now 
much more mobile and people are more willing to move to take up job offers. This has 
severed traditional community ties and reduced social cohesion.
Now that governments have invested in agriculture and information technology, agricultural 
extension services and weather forecasters are able to provide early warnings to farmers on 
LPSHQGLQJ GURXJKWV DQG ÀRRGV WRJHWKHU ZLWK LQIRUPDWLRQ WR KHOS WKHP SODQW KDUYHVW DQG 
PDUNHW WKHLU SURGXFH LQ RUGHU WR PD[LPL]H WKHLU SUR¿WDELOLW\ 7KHUH LV LPSURYHG DFFHVV WR 
private health care for some, due to investment in health service provision by the private 
sector. Government action has focused on disease prevention, while general health care 
remains underfunded. The urban poor cannot afford private health care, but state-managed 
hospitals are understaffed and poorly equipped. Meanwhile, commercial farms have invested 
in knowledge and skills development, as well as health facilities, for their employees and their 
families as part of their growth strategies. This has had the effect of improving health care in 
rural areas. 
Figure 23. Industrious Ants: “Advances in information technology, including the 
LQVWDOODWLRQ RI ÀEUH RSWLF FDEOHV KDYH UHGXFHG FRPPXQLFDWLRQ FRVWV ZKLOH UHJLRQDO 79 
stations now advertise and create demand for products among a wider audience than 
ever before.”
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Availability of credit has also increased as a result of private sector investment, with an 
LQFUHDVH LQ WKH QXPEHU RI ¿QDQFLDO VHUYLFH SURYLGHUV 6PDOOKROGHUV DUH DEOH WR REWDLQ FUHGLW 
to invest in cash crops and livestock and hence lift themselves out of the subsistence trap, but 
many are still highly vulnerable to crop failure and payment default, which can drive them 
deeper into poverty, rendering them unable to pay the rent or even forcing them to sell their 
ODQG 0HGLXP DQG ODUJHVFDOH FRPPHUFLDO IDUPHUV ¿QG LW HDVLHU WR EHQH¿W IURP LQFUHDVHG 
availability of credit, which enables them to invest in new technologies that will increase 
SURGXFWLYLW\ DQG HI¿FLHQF\ 
Agriculture: food for East Africans
%\ 01 PRVW FRXQWULHV LQ WKH UHJLRQ KDG LQYHVWHG 10 SHUFHQW RI *'3 LQ DJULFXOWXUH 
in line with the 2003 Maputo Declaration. This improved farmers’ access to enhanced 
production technologies, affordable credit and market information. Investments were also 
made in irrigated agriculture and food processing industries. Meanwhile, existing regional 
agreements on extension, research and innovation, credit, agroprocessing and marketing were 
strengthened. The processing sector also created employment opportunities, with positive 
effects on food and livelihood security. 
Agriculture in East Africa has received a tremendous boost during the past ten years, 
following expanded market opportunities within the EAC itself. However, despite investment 
in agricultural research and extension, some areas remain highly vulnerable to crop failure, 
particularly in the face of increasing climate variability.
In high-potential areas, farm operations have become more specialized. Increasing returns to 
farming have led to a steep rise in the cost of land. As a result, smallholders with less than 1 
KHFWDUH ZKR QHHG DOO WKHLU ODQG WR IHHG WKH IDPLO\ ¿QG WKHPVHOYHV ORFNHG RXW RI H[SDQGLQJ 
markets. Those who can make the necessary investments in land and other resources 
increasingly specialize in cash crop and livestock production to meet the demands and 
standards of the global market. Productivity has increased following the broad-scale adoption 
of new agricultural technologies. While jobs have been created, increasing mechanization 
has displaced many farm labourers and subsistence farmers, with many young, educated rural 
people migrating to urban areas while the less well educated stay put but are forced to rely on 
seasonal jobs on commercial farms. However, better access to market intelligence has allowed 
farmers, especially the more entrepreneurial smallholders, to respond to new opportunities 
and adapt to market forces.
Overgrazing and climate change have reduced the carrying capacity of many pastures, and some 
areas have been abandoned. Many pastoralists have had to give up their traditional way of life, 
although governments are supporting pastoralists’ livelihoods through subsidies. However, there 
has been a shift to more intensive peri-urban livestock production systems to meet the increased 
demand for livestock products from a wealthier urban population. In fact, aided by a new 
regional livestock market information system, the EAC has been exporting livestock products to 
the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa in ever increasing quantities additional to already well-
established trade with these regions. A regional steering committee on transboundary animal 
diseases, formed in 2020, has contributed to improved livestock health and productivity. 
Climate change has had a wide range of impacts on ecosystems, putting water and grazing 
resources under extreme pressure. Investment in water infrastructure, especially small 
dams, has allowed irrigated agriculture to expand, but the increasing frequency of drought 
poses a growing threat to the stability of agricultural and ecological systems. The warmer 
temperatures have allowed food crop yields to rise in the highland areas, but higher 
evapotranspiration in the arid and semi-arid areas has led to productivity declines.

Considerable support from the Global Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Fund 
for the development of carbon-neutral ‘conservation agriculture’ has boosted agricultural 
productivity on smallholdings. To date, farmers and consumers in Kenya, Tanzania and 
8JDQGD KDYH EHQH¿WHG WKH PRVW IURP WKLV QHZ DSSURDFK ZKLFK LV JUDGXDOO\ VSUHDGLQJ 
throughout the region. Generally, better education, information and access to credit have 
allowed smallholders to be more proactive in the face of climate change, but the poorest are 
still highly vulnerable. 
,Q 01 SURPSWHG E\ JURZLQJ JOREDO GHPDQG IRU IRRG DQG VWURQJHU OREE\LQJ IURP (DVW 
Africa, the reinvigorated World Trade Organization (WTO) made a major breakthrough when 
LW RYHUVDZ WKH UHPRYDO RI WUDGH EDUULHUV LQ GHYHORSHG FRXQWULHV QRWDEO\ WKH (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ 
and an increase in trade subsidies to developing regions. As a result, agricultural output from 
African countries became increasingly competitive. Exports of such cash crops as coffee, 
tea, cashew, coconut and sugarcane were boosted by regional policies and subsidies. By 
2030, these initiatives had begun to generate impressive foreign exchange earnings, thereby 
increasing the purchasing power of the EAC’s commercial farmers. Of course, these gains 
depended heavily on the level of demand from global markets, which remain unpredictable 
GXH WR WKH LQWHJUDWHG QDWXUH RI WKH JOREDO HFRQRP\ 3HULRGLF FROODSVHV LQ VSHFL¿F PDUNHWV KDYH 
been offset by overall gains, but farmers in affected sectors have suffered losses. For example, 
during the drought years, when the common currency was weaker, farmers exporting coffee 
UHFHLYHG D ZLQGIDOO EXW E\ 0 WKHUH ZDV D JOXW RQ WKH ZRUOG PDUNHW DQG SULFHV IHOO DEUXSWO\ 
Food security: dependence, independence, interdependence
National food security, in the sense of availability, has taken a high priority in EAC 
GHYHORSPHQW SODQV VLQFH 01 EXW WKLV SROLWLFDO ZLOO KDV QRW DOZD\V EHHQ WUDQVODWHG LQWR 
radical changes on the ground, with some communities still living with a constant threat of 
hunger. 
Due to its proactive governance stance, the EAC has attempted to keep a balance in the 
region’s agricultural production. There has been a concerted effort to expand the production of 
such traditional crops as sweet potatoes, indigenous vegetables, cassava and yams, at the same 
time as increasing the yields of cereals and cash crops. 
Strong national agricultural research programmes have ensured farmers can access the 
LQSXWV LQFOXGLQJ FHUWL¿HG VHHGV DQG WKH WUDLQLQJ WKH\ QHHG WR JURZ LPSURYHG YDULHWLHV RI 
traditional crops, some of which have been bred for improved nutritional value as well as 
better resistance to pests, diseases and adverse climatic conditions. The devastating drought 
of 2020–2022 had far-reaching effects on food security and the region’s economy. The EAC 
KDG HVWDEOLVKHG JUDLQ UHVHUYHV LQ 01 ZLWK DVVLVWDQFH IURP WKH 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV¶ )RRG DQG 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP), and these were 
VXI¿FLHQW WR IHHG WKH SRSXODWLRQ GXULQJ WKH ¿UVW DQG VHFRQG \HDUV RI WKH GURXJKW +RZHYHU WKH 
region needed external support in the form of emergency food aid and imports from the global 
market during the third year. Severe malnutrition and deaths were avoided, with only 100 
GHDWKV UHSRUWHG LQ FRPSDULVRQ WR  00 ZKHQ D VLPLODU GURXJKW VWUXFN LQ 000 /DUJHU UHJLRQDO 
grain reserves for key cereals such as maize and wheat were established in 2023 to protect 
against similar events in the future. 
Biosafety and food safety standards have improved, with effective measures put in place to 
SURWHFW FRQVXPHUV IURP DÀDWR[LQV LQ JUDLQ DQG XQVDIH PHDW DQG PHDW SURGXFWV 8UEDQL]DWLRQ 
and foreign investment have led to a growth in the consumption of processed food, with an 
increasing number of junk food restaurants linked to rising levels of obesity and diabetes among 
wealthier urbanites. However, this trend is moderated by strong government health regulations. 

Environments: struggling with trade-offs 
Agricultural expansion has put pressure on natural resources, particularly soil, water and 
forests. Recognizing the critical role played by natural resources in economic development, 
the region’s leaders began negotiations on their sustainable management in 2010. By 
01 WKH\ KDG PDGH FRQVLGHUDEOH SURJUHVV LQ VWUHDPOLQLQJ QDWLRQDO SROLFLHV UHJDUGLQJ WKH 
management of forests, water and minerals. For example, regional initiatives were put in place 
to increase the area of land under forest, promote soil and water conservation, control the 
parasitic weed striga and prevent the transboundary spread of human and livestock diseases. 
%\ 0 WKH ($& KDG RYHUVHHQ WKH UHIRUHVWDWLRQ RI 1 SHUFHQW RI SUHYLRXVO\ GHJUDGHG IRUHVW 
DUHDV EHQH¿WLQJ IURP JOREDO FOLPDWH FKDQJH PLWLJDWLRQ IXQGV 
Transboundary water resource management took a step forward with management agreements 
IRU WKH /DNH 9LFWRULD EDVLQ EHLQJ HVWDEOLVKHG LQ 01 DQG IRU WKH 1LOH %DVLQ EHLQJ IXOO\ 
LPSOHPHQWHG E\ 0 7KHVH DJUHHPHQWV HQDEOHG PHPEHU FRXQWULHV WR DEVWUDFW ZDWHU DQG 
H[SDQG WKH DUHD XQGHU LUULJDWHG DJULFXOWXUH +RZHYHU WKH /DNH 9LFWRULD ¿VKLQJ FRPPXQLWLHV 
have been largely overlooked in drawing up these agreements and they have yet to see any 
EHQH¿WV 
Water consumption has increased markedly due to increased irrigation and rising demand 
from urban populations and industries. However, this growth in consumption is now slowing 
GXH WR WKH XVH RI PRUH HI¿FLHQW LUULJDWLRQ DQG LQGXVWULDO ZDWHUXVH WHFKQRORJLHV ZKLOH 
good water governance has improved the availability of water. Perhaps more importantly, 
DJULFXOWXUDO GRPHVWLF DQG LQGXVWULDO ZDWHUXVH HI¿FLHQF\ KDV LPSURYHG 3ULFLQJ VFKHPHV IRU 
water are in place and enforced, with water utilities investing their income in improved water 
infrastructure. There has also been a fall in the number of prosecutions for water pollution, 
paralleled by an increase in the success rate of such prosecutions.
Figure 24. Industrious Ants: “Urbanization and foreign investment have led to a 
JURZWK LQ WKH FRQVXPSWLRQ RI SURFHVVHG IRRG ZLWK DQ LQFUHDVLQJ QXPEHU RI MXQN IRRG 
restaurants linked to rising levels of obesity and diabetes among wealthier urbanites.”

'XULQJ WKH 00V PDULQH ¿VKLQJ OLYHOLKRRGV VXIIHUHG IROORZLQJ SURWUDFWHG GLVSXWHV ZLWK 
0R]DPELFDQ DQG $VLDQ ODUJHVFDOH ¿VKLQJ HQWHUSULVHV DQG DWWDFNV E\ 6RPDOL SLUDWHV %\ 00 
now that Somalia has joined the EAC, the attacks have diminished due to effective actions of 
a regionally coordinated marine policy force. 
7KH HIIHFWV RI DJULFXOWXUDO LQWHQVL¿FDWLRQ RQ QDWXUDO UHVRXUFHV KDYH EHHQ EXIIHUHG E\ D IRFXV 
on sustainability in new technology development and dissemination. Deforestation is being 
brought under control through proper enforcement of forest management law, but there has 
still been some soil loss in forest areas as cropping expands into steeper hillside areas and 
UDLQVWRUPV LQWHQVLI\ DV FOLPDWH FKDQJH WDNHV KROG 5HSODQWLQJ XQGHU WKH 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV 
REDD programme, supported by regional agreements with NGOs, has also reduced net 
deforestation. While the use of agricultural chemicals has risen, water pollution regulations 
came into full effect in the 2020s and new integrated pest management technologies have 
reduced the need for pesticides. Regulations on the conversion of land for agriculture succeed 
in preventing the loss of valuable wetland habitats in all but a few locations. Other types of 
land conversion, such as human settlement, have contributed minor amounts of soil erosion 
and carbon depletion.
In many rural areas, the pressure to convert marginal and protected land to commercial 
agriculture has threatened to become irresistible. In general, however, strict law enforcement 
has halted such agricultural expansion in many places and regional biodiversity has 
maintained to some extent. Local by-laws and user associations are backed up by national 
government and regional policy, which has overseen the return of much forest land to local 
community management. There has been a marked reduction in the number of people being 
prosecuted for illegal poaching, logging and grazing in protected areas. 
0
Quantifying scenarios: semi-quantitative indicators
Once scenario narratives had been generated, participants described what these scenarios 
meant for a set of indicators. This set of indicators was generated by participants to represent 
what they considered to be the scope of interest associated with food security, environments 
and livelihoods. Participants proceeded to indicate what they thought were the directions and 
magnitudes of change for each indicator over multiple time steps, and provided the logic for 
these changes from the relevant scenario. 
7KH IROORZLQJ LQGLFDWRUV ZHUH RXWOLQHG RQ D VFDOH RI  WR  XVLQJ GHVFULSWLRQV RI WKH ORJLF 
for change: 
 GDP 
 corruption
 political stability
 infrastructure development
 urbanization
 yields of rainfed crops
 yields of irrigated crops
 area of rainfed arable land
 area of irrigated arable land
 livestock numbers
 livestock yields
 agricultural input costs
 nutrition
 dietary diversity
 poverty
 equity
 access to health care
 forest cover change
 biodiversity
The required inputs for the IMPACT and GLOBIOM models were among this list of 
indicators. By outlining semi-quantitative assessments of change, the scenarios process 
participants provided information for the conversion of the scenarios assumptions into 
quantitative model drivers.
7KH WDEOHV EHORZ 1 WR  SURYLGH VHPLTXDQWLWDWLYH LQIRUPDWLRQ DERXW WKH GHYHORSPHQWV 
of a number of indicators for economy and governance, food production and food security, 
OLYHOLKRRGV DQG HQYLURQPHQWV IRU WKH  VFHQDULRV IRU (DVWHUQ $IULFD &DUH ZDV WDNHQ QRW MXVW 
to specify the direction of change in each variable, but also why each change happened. 
Capturing the logic behind each change helps interpret further analyses using the scenarios as 
well as the quantitative model outputs. 
The consistency between changes in different indicators was also reviewed with the 
stakeholders while developing these assessments of directions of change. 
Table 1. Economy and governance indicators.
Indicator Industrious Ants Herd of Zebra Lone Leopards Sleeping Lions
 2020 2030 2020 2030 2020 2030 2020 2030
Gross 
Domestic 
Product
       
Why?
Broad 
development push 
for food security, 
environments, 
livelihoods
Focus on industry, 
services, tourism, 
export agriculture
3UR¿WDEOH ELODWHUDO 
arrangements 
but differences 
between sectors 
and countries
8QSURGXFWLYH 
collaboration with 
H[WHUQDO DFWRUV 
lack of regional 
institutions
Corruption-
free 
institutions
  -- -- -- -- --- ---
Why?
Regional 
collaboration takes 
time to become 
effective
New regional 
institutions become 
vehicles for 
corruption
Failures as well as 
successes but lack 
of coordination
Lack of regulations
Political 
stability   -  -- -- -- --
Why?
National issues 
have to be worked 
RXW ¿UVW
Some initial 
FRQÀLFWV RYHU 
resources, later 
solved
&RQÀLFWV RYHU 
UHVRXUFHV WUDGH
Ineffective 
JRYHUQDQFH QR 
collaboration
Infrastructure        
Why? Long-term investment
Investment for 
industry
Patchwork 
improvement
Solely due to 
outside investment 
± EXW GLI¿FXOW GXH 
to lack of support
Urbanization        
Why?
Not extreme 
because of rural 
investment
8UEDQL]DWLRQ 
responds to 
investment sectors
8UEDQL]DWLRQ 
responds to 
investment sectors
Lack of rural 
livelihoods
1
Quantifying scenarios: semi-quantitative indicators
Once scenario narratives had been generated, participants described what these scenarios 
meant for a set of indicators. This set of indicators was generated by participants to represent 
what they considered to be the scope of interest associated with food security, environments 
and livelihoods. Participants proceeded to indicate what they thought were the directions and 
magnitudes of change for each indicator over multiple time steps, and provided the logic for 
these changes from the relevant scenario. 
7KH IROORZLQJ LQGLFDWRUV ZHUH RXWOLQHG RQ D VFDOH RI  WR  XVLQJ GHVFULSWLRQV RI WKH ORJLF 
for change: 
 GDP 
 corruption
 political stability
 infrastructure development
 urbanization
 yields of rainfed crops
 yields of irrigated crops
 area of rainfed arable land
 area of irrigated arable land
 livestock numbers
 livestock yields
 agricultural input costs
 nutrition
 dietary diversity
 poverty
 equity
 access to health care
 forest cover change
 biodiversity
The required inputs for the IMPACT and GLOBIOM models were among this list of 
indicators. By outlining semi-quantitative assessments of change, the scenarios process 
participants provided information for the conversion of the scenarios assumptions into 
quantitative model drivers.
7KH WDEOHV EHORZ 1 WR  SURYLGH VHPLTXDQWLWDWLYH LQIRUPDWLRQ DERXW WKH GHYHORSPHQWV 
of a number of indicators for economy and governance, food production and food security, 
OLYHOLKRRGV DQG HQYLURQPHQWV IRU WKH  VFHQDULRV IRU (DVWHUQ $IULFD &DUH ZDV WDNHQ QRW MXVW 
to specify the direction of change in each variable, but also why each change happened. 
Capturing the logic behind each change helps interpret further analyses using the scenarios as 
well as the quantitative model outputs. 
The consistency between changes in different indicators was also reviewed with the 
stakeholders while developing these assessments of directions of change. 
Table 1. Economy and governance indicators.
Indicator Industrious Ants Herd of Zebra Lone Leopards Sleeping Lions
 2020 2030 2020 2030 2020 2030 2020 2030
Gross 
Domestic 
Product
       
Why?
Broad 
development push 
for food security, 
environments, 
livelihoods
Focus on industry, 
services, tourism, 
export agriculture
3UR¿WDEOH ELODWHUDO 
arrangements 
but differences 
between sectors 
and countries
8QSURGXFWLYH 
collaboration with 
H[WHUQDO DFWRUV 
lack of regional 
institutions
Corruption-
free 
institutions
  -- -- -- -- --- ---
Why?
Regional 
collaboration takes 
time to become 
effective
New regional 
institutions become 
vehicles for 
corruption
Failures as well as 
successes but lack 
of coordination
Lack of regulations
Political 
stability   -  -- -- -- --
Why?
National issues 
have to be worked 
RXW ¿UVW
Some initial 
FRQÀLFWV RYHU 
resources, later 
solved
&RQÀLFWV RYHU 
UHVRXUFHV WUDGH
Ineffective 
JRYHUQDQFH QR 
collaboration
Infrastructure        
Why? Long-term investment
Investment for 
industry
Patchwork 
improvement
Solely due to 
outside investment 
± EXW GLI¿FXOW GXH 
to lack of support
Urbanization        
Why?
Not extreme 
because of rural 
investment
8UEDQL]DWLRQ 
responds to 
investment sectors
8UEDQL]DWLRQ 
responds to 
investment sectors
Lack of rural 
livelihoods

Table 2. Food production and food security indicators.
Indicator Industrious Ants Herd of Zebra Lone Leopards Sleeping Lions
 2020 2030 2020 2030 2020 2030 2020 2030
Yields of 
rainfed crops       -- --
Why? Effective support (tech and skills)
Not a government 
priority
Last decade sees 
NGO/CSO support
Environmental 
GHJUDGDWLRQ 
failing support
Yields of 
irrigated crops        
Why?
Investment 
in production 
for regional 
consumption
Investment in 
export agriculture
Investment in 
export agriculture
Marginal increase 
for export crops
Area of rainfed 
arable land        
Why?
Attempts to 
moderate 
expansion
Smallholders 
expand 
uncontrolled
Some mitigation 
of expansion by 
state/non-state 
partnerships
Drive by need for 
food security
Area of 
irrigated 
arable land
       
Why?
Attempts to 
moderate 
expansion
Export agriculture
Some mitigation 
of expansion by 
state/non-state 
partnerships
Only export crops 
produced by 
external actors
Livestock 
numbers  0   -   
Why? Policies to mitigate livestock impacts
Pastoralists decline 
XQGHU SUHVVXUHV 
number of poultry 
grows
Pastoralists decline 
XQGHU SUHVVXUHV 
number of poultry 
grows
Pastoralists decline 
XQGHU SUHVVXUH 
some poultry
Livestock 
yields        
Why?
Investment in 
different animals, 
actors, production 
systems
Ruminants decline 
but poultry grows
Ruminants decline 
but poultry grows
Marginal tech 
investment in 
poultry
Agricultural 
production cost 
improvements
    --  --- ---
Why? More fair and transparent pricing
Rising fuel 
FRVWV LQHIIHFWLYH 
governance
5LVLQJ IXHO FRVWV 
state/non-state 
partnerships have 
positive impacts 
later
5LVLQJ IXHO FRVWV 
DUWL¿FLDO UDLVLQJ RI 
prices
Nutrition     -  --- ---
Why?
Focal point for 
government 
policies
%HQH¿WV RI 
development 
spread unequally
Food security 
partnerships form 
in the last decade
No efforts 
WR PLWLJDWH 
communities’ 
expertise grows
Dietary 
diversity    
No 
change  --- --
Why?
Focal point for 
government 
policies
%HQH¿WV RI 
development 
spread unequally
Food security 
partnerships form 
in the last decade
No efforts 
WR PLWLJDWH 
communities’ 
expertise grows

Table 3. Livelihoods indicators.
Indicator Industrious Ants Herd of Zebra Lone Leopards Sleeping Lions
 2020 2030 2020 2030 2020 2030 2020 2030
Poverty 
improvements     --  -- ---
Why?
Broad 
development push 
for food security, 
environments, 
livelihoods
%HQH¿WV RI 
development 
spread unequally
State/non-state 
partnerships 
become effective
Little support from 
state/non-state 
actors
Equity -- -- -- -- -- -- --- ---
Why? Equity decrease with rising GDP
Equity decrease 
with rising GDP
Differences 
between countries 
but overall 
decrease with 
rising GDP
Little support from 
state/non-state 
actors
Access to 
health care    
No 
Change  -- --
Why? Broad development push
%HQH¿WV RI 
development 
spread unequally
State/non-state 
partnerships 
become effective
Little support from 
state/non-state 
actors
Table 4. Environmental indicators
Indicator Industrious Ants Herd of Zebra Lone Leopards Sleeping Lions
 2020 2030 2020 2030 2020 2030 2020 2030
Forest 
conservation --- -- --- --- ---  --- ---
Why?
Governments/
NGOs 
struggle with 
environmental 
governance
Ineffective 
environmental 
governance
Mobilization 
of regional and 
international 
NGOs
Environmental 
degradation 
unmitigated
Biodiversity --- -- --- --- ---  --- ---
Why? Governments/NGOs struggle
Ineffective 
environmental 
governance
Mobilization 
of regional and 
international 
NGOs
Environmental 
degradation 
unmitigated

Quantitative analysis of the scenarios
The stakeholder-driven scenarios presented in the previous section have been translated 
into a number of semi-quantitative indicators through directions and logics of change 
provided by the regional stakeholders. These assumptions were made on the basis of the 
scenario narratives. A set of these semi-quantitative indicators have been used to provide 
LQSXWV IRU IXOO TXDQWL¿FDWLRQ RI WKH VFHQDULRV WKURXJK  JOREDO DJULFXOWXUDO HFRQRPLF PRGHOV 
IMPACT (5RVHJUDQW HW DO 1, Rosegrant 2012) and GLOBIOM (Havlik et al. 2011). These 
models have been used to generate information about select long-term consequences of the 
stakeholder-generated scenarios. They also allow stakeholder assumptions about regional 
socio-economic change to be put against top-down, long-term global socio-economic 
projections such as future global food demand. 
Through an iterative process, the results from both models for East Africa were discussed with 
regional actors to ensure that they were plausible, relevant and challenging for the regional 
context and consistent with original scenarios. The challenge of combining stakeholder 
generated scenarios and scenarios as model outputs is that the models are limited in the 
ÀH[LELOLW\ RI WKHLU EDVLF DVVXPSWLRQV DV WR ZKDW IXWXUHV WKH\ FDQ H[SORUH DQG IRFXV PRUH RQ 
the ‘known unknowns’. The scenarios process facilitators therefore take care to point out the 
models’ limitations and the differences between the models’ basic assumptions to prospective 
XVHUV 7KLV LV WKH EHQH¿W RI VXFK DQ µHQVHPEOH DSSURDFK¶ ± XVLQJ PXOWLSOH PRGHOV RIIHUV D PRUH 
diverse perspective on plausible futures and underlines the value of engaging with uncertainty. 
Model descriptions
GLOBIOM
IIASA developed and uses GLOBIOM to provide insight for global land use competition 
by integrating the major land-based production sectors: agriculture, bioenergy and forestry. 
GLOBIOM can be used in scenarios analysis to assess how socio-economic development 
resulting from different governance and policy strategies affect not only the agricultural sector 
through food availability but also the environment through deforestation by area growth in 
pasture and crop land. The model accounts for changes in supply and demand for 20 globally 
important crops, livestock production activities, major forestry commodities, and multiple 
bioenergy transformation pathways using a detailed representation of each sector. The 
model is spatially explicit and accounts for all major land use types in terms of production. 
Demand for agriculture, bioenergy, and forestry products is determined for the 30 regions 
within GLOBIOM. Trade is modelled under the homogenous good assumption and where 
RSWLPDO ELODWHUDO WUDGHÀRZV UHVXOW IURP WKH PLQLPL]DWLRQ RI WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO WUDGH FRVWV 
which include tariffs and transportation costs (7DND\DPD DQG -XGJH 11). GLOBIOM has 
been widely used for understanding the effects of policies on global land use and associated 
GHG emissions. Studies have examined the effects of regional policies on global land use for 
bioenergy (Frank et al. 2013, Mosnier et al. 2013) and the trade-off effects of improved crop 
productivity on food security, the livestock sector, and GHG emissions (Havlik et al. 2013b, 
Valin et al. 2013).
IMPACT
IFPRI developed and uses IMPACT to provide long-term scenarios for the global agricultural 
sector. It can be used in the development of regional scenarios to focus on the countries of 
a region, their interactions with the world through trade, and how this relates to agricultural 

SURGXFWLRQ ,03$&7 PRGHOV JOREDO WUDGH WKRXJK ZRUOG SULFHV IRU  FRPPRGLWLHV DQG 
OLYHVWRFN SURGXFWV ZKLFK DUH GHWHUPLQHG E\ WKH GRPHVWLF VXSSO\ DQG GHPDQG RI WKH 11 
regions. IMPACT is a partial equilibrium model with thematic focuses on water demand and 
availability as well as the effects of climate change on limiting crop yields and area potential. 
IMPACT has been widely used in food security scenarios analyses including the Global Food 
Projections to 2020 (Rosegrant et al. 2001) and more recently with a commodity investment 
study in Food Security, Farming, and Climate Change to 2050 (Nelson et al. 2010), as 
well as regional analyses on climate effects on agriculture in West African Agriculture and 
Climate Change (Jalloh et al. 2013)  and Southern African Agriculture and Climate Change 
(Hachigonta et al. 2013).
Drivers
Drivers used as inputs into both models were based on interactions with diverse regional 
stakeholders involved in the CCAFS scenarios process, who provided semi-quantitative 
assessments of these drivers of change and the assumptions behind those assessments. 
2QFH WKH ¿UVW PRGHO RXWSXWV ZHUH JHQHUDWHG EDVHG RQ WKHVH LQSXWV UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV RI WKH 
participants in the process were able to criticize the results on their plausibility and usefulness 
for the region, after which subsequent iterations of the model runs were done. 
Population
3RSXODWLRQ JURZWK SURMHFWLRQV IROORZ WKH PHGLXP YDULDQW JURZWK SURMHFWLRQV IURP WKH 81 
population database 2010 revision (8QLWHG 1DWLRQV 3RSXODWLRQ 'LYLVLRQ 010). This growth in 
population is assumed to be the same for all scenarios and also between the models. In East 
Africa from 2010 to 2030, population is projected to grow by more than 60 percent, exceeding 
360 million by 2030 ()LJXUH  *OREDOO\ SRSXODWLRQ LV SURMHFWHG UHDFK  ELOOLRQ SHRSOH DQ 
increase of 21 percent from 2010 to 2030. 
)LJXUH  3RSXODWLRQ SURMHFWLRQ IRU (DVW $IULFD LQ PLOOLRQV RI SHRSOH IURP WKH 81 
population database, 2010 revision (United Nations Population Division 2010).

Gross domestic product
)LJXUH  VKRZV WKH UHJLRQDO *'3 IRU WKH  VFHQDULRV IURP 010 WR 00 WKDW ZDV XVHG LQ 
the simulations with the 2 models. These GDP projections follow the narrative assumptions, 
based on historic GDP and using IFPRI’s Food Security, Farming, and Climate Change to 
2050 (Nelson 2010) scenarios analysis as a plausibility envelope. Industrious Ants, Herd of 
Zebra and Lone Leopards have similar GDP projections, while the regional GDP for Sleeping 
Lions is much lower. 
7KH UDWHV RI *'3 JURZWK WKURXJKRXW WKH SHULRG DUH VLPLODU IRU WKH ¿UVW WKUHH VFHQDULRV EXW 
the way in which the growth is achieved differs for each narrative. The GDP for Industrious 
$QWV UHÀHFWV WKH QRWLRQ WKDW WKLV VFHQDULR IHDWXUHV QRW VR PXFK D UXQ RI TXLFN GHYHORSPHQW 
but a slow and structural set of investments in broad goals around food security, environments 
DQG OLYHOLKRRGV 7KH *'3 IRU +HUG RI =HEUD UHÀHFWV WKH DVVXPSWLRQ WKDW (DVW $IULFD LQ WKLV 
future world pushes strongly for GDP-oriented economic development, but issues around 
food security and livelihoods for the poor are neglected and this hampers growth – though this 
VFHQDULR VWLOO KDV WKH KLJKHVW *'3 RI DOO  
In the Lone Leopards world, regional economic development is fragmented in magnitude 
and character, with a number of activities focusing on proactively improving food security, 
environments and livelihoods but with other activities, driven by multinationals, following a 
SUR¿WVRQO\ LQGXVWULDOL]DWLRQ PRGHO +RZHYHU VLQFH WKHUH LV D ODFN RI LQVWLWXWLRQDO VXSSRUW DQG 
few attempts to integrate economies, regional economic development stays somewhat lower. 
In the Sleeping Lions future, because of a lack of action by state and non-state actors toward 
long-term economic development, GDP is much lower than in the other futures. Foreign 
SULYDWH VHFWRU DFWRUV FRPH LQ WR PDNH TXLFN SUR¿WV FRQWULEXWLQJ VLJQL¿FDQWO\ WR *'3 EXW 
these are not long-term investments. The lack of government support and infrastructure for 
investment further contributes to this relatively low GDP increase. In GLOBIOM, demand 
for crops and livestock products as well as wood products are driven by increases in GDP in 
addition to growth in population. Demand for crops and livestock products are also driven by 
increases in GDP and population for IMPACT as well.
Figure 26. Regional GDP for the 4 scenarios 2010–2030.

Production costs
5HJDUGLQJ SURGXFWLRQ FRVWV */2%,20 ¿QGV D PDUNHW HTXLOLEULXP VROXWLRQ E\ PD[LPL]LQJ 
the consumer and producer surplus under market conditions and resource constraints. 
Producer surplus takes into account the various costs of production. These have been included 
in the scenarios by inferring that the different quality of governance and levels of regional 
integration in each scenario have implications for the production costs for farmers. Industrious 
Ants represents a future where proactive governments develop a regionally integrated market 
structure that results in a relative decrease in production costs by 2030. In Herd of Zebra, 
reactive governments are slow to respond to regional issues but eventually stop increases in 
production costs. In Lone Leopards, infrastructure and government instability raise production 
costs, but strong action by NGOs and the private sector eventually lowers production costs 
somewhat later in the period. For the Sleeping Lions scenario, infrastructure and government 
instability raise production costs for all crops in the period. 
For the purposes of this analysis, IMPACT does not take into account changes in the costs for 
producers. 
Crop yields 
Each scenario has different consequences for technological improvements on crop yields. In 
the Industrious Ants scenario, investments focus on staple foods for regional consumption. In 
the Herd of Zebra scenario, attempts at such investments are less effective and therefore the 
yields are not as high. The Lone Leopards scenario sees stronger investments in technological 
improvements for the yields of export crops. Finally, in Sleeping Lions, overall technological 
improvements on yields are limited, and also mainly focused on export crops. While crop 
yields in IMPACT include the technological improvements underlying the scenarios, yields 
may also be affected by a crop’s own price and the price of other crops. In GLOBIOM, 
yields follow a pattern of growth in keeping with historical trends as well as including the 
LPSURYHPHQWV LQ \LHOGV VSHFL¿F WR HDFK VFHQDULR
Crop production systems
*/2%,20 GH¿QHV FURS SURGXFWLRQ V\VWHPV DV KLJK LQSXW ORZ LQSXW VXEVLVWHQFH DQG 
irrigated. IMPACT summarizes the crop production systems in 2 categories: irrigated, and 
rainfed. )LJXUH  and )LJXUH  illustrate the compositional change in harvest area over 
WKH WLPH SHULRG IRU HDFK RI WKH  VFHQDULRV 7KH VWRU\OLQHV GLVFXVV WKH LPSDFW RI VKLIWV LQ 
production and these can be seen in moving crop production from subsistence agriculture into 
high and low input production and also the switch from low input to high input agricultural 
production. The increase in irrigated agriculture is also addressed by the scenarios narratives 
DQG SUHVHQWHG LQ DQ LQFUHDVH LQ DUHD IRU DOO VFHQDULRV EXW PRVW VLJQL¿FDQWO\ IRU WKH /RQH 
Leopards and Sleeping Lions scenarios.
Livestock numbers, yields and production systems
*/2%,20 DQG ,03$&7 FKDUDFWHUL]H OLYHVWRFN SURGXFWLRQ LQWR  ODUJH VSHFLHV JURXSV 
ERYLQHV VPDOO UXPLQDQWV SLJV DQG SRXOWU\ 7KH FODVVL¿FDWLRQ IRU OLYHVWRFN SURGXFWLRQ 
takes into account the agroecological zone, the intensity of livestock production and feeding 
PHWKRGV DGDSWHG IURP 6HUp DQG 6WHLQIHOG 1 ,QFUHDVH LQ LQWHQVL¿FDWLRQ RU H[WHQVL¿FDWLRQ 
and feed substitutions are ways in which the model allows for shifts between production 
systems. In the Industrious Ants scenario analysis, GLOBIOM simulates the share of bovines 

in the arid grassland will decrease slightly over the time period, while the mixed temperate 
and urban system will increase slightly over the time period. There is a broad support to 
raise yields for animal products. Herd of Zebra sees a similar pattern but, here, support is 
less effective across the board. In Lone Leopards, support for is mainly focused on yields of 
animal products associated with urbanization, like poultry, and farming systems associated 
with this production. Sleeping Lions also sees no support for yield increase and a focus on 
urbanization-oriented production systems.
In IMPACT, the livestock yields are driven by an exogenous yield trend that is an input into the 
model. For the number of animals slaughtered, there is an exogenous trend on herd size, but 
there is also an endogenous response to prices of the animal product and of the animal feeds. For 
the scenarios, the exogenous trend in livestock yields in IMPACT sees a productivity increase 
for beef, lamb, milk, pork and poultry in the Industrious Ants and Herd of Zebra scenarios. 
While the Lone Leopards scenario sees rather small productivity increases and in the Sleeping 
Lions scenarios, there is no improvement in livestock yield from 2010 to 2030. 
Figure 27. Crop production systems in 2000 baseline, and for each scenario in 2030.
Figure 28. IMPACT Crop production systems in 2000 baseline, and for each scenario in 
2030.
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Figure 28. IMPACT Crop production systems in 2000 baseline, and for each scenario in 
2030.
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The positive trend in herd size for all livestock is the Industrious Ants highlighted by the large 
increase in the lamb, pork, beef, milk, and poultry sectors, while in the Herd or Zebra the 
number of livestock should increase but not as dramatically for milk and pork. The dramatic 
increase in the numbers of livestock is due to the storyline for both scenarios which sees 
increased support for agricultural production as well as higher yields in feed crops. In the 
Lone Leopards scenario the increase in livestock numbers is relatively stable and increasing 
for all livestock sectors, but highest for beef, lamb and poultry. The numbers of livestock 
in Sleeping Lions is relatively small throughout the period due to the lack of support for 
agriculture in the scenario storyline.
Land use change emissions tax
GLOBIOM is able to simulate the effects of different land use change scenarios on emissions. 
7KH PRGHO FODVVL¿HV VL[ GLIIHUHQW ODQG FRYHU FDWHJRULHV PDQDJHG DQG XQPDQDJHG IRUHVWV 
short rotation tree plantation, grassland, cropland, and other natural vegetation. GLOBIOM 
WDNHV LQWR DFFRXQW WKH SUR¿WDELOLW\ RI HDFK ODQG W\SH DQG DOORZV ODQG WR PRYH IURP RQH W\SH 
WR DQRWKHU )RU WKH ,QGXVWULRXV $QWV VFHQDULR D 86' 0 WD[ ZDV DSSOLHG WR FDUERQ GLR[LGH 
(CO2) emissions from all land conversions in the GLOBIOM model. Currently, the IMPACT 
model does not include land use types other than irrigated and rainfed cropland. For the Herd 
RI =HEUD VFHQDULR D WD[ RI 86' 10 ZDV DSSOLHG WR &22 emissions from all land conversions in 
the GLOBIOM model. For the Lone Leopards scenario, a tax was applied to CO2 emissions 
IURP RQO\ GHIRUHVWDWLRQ LQ WKH */2%,20 PRGHO ± ZKLFK UHÀHFWV WKH GLVSDULW\ EHWZHHQ 
effective policies in one domain and the absence of policies in another. For the Sleeping Lions 
scenario, no tax was applied to CO2 emissions from land use change. 
Model outputs
Livestock demand, production and trade
Figure 30 and )LJXUH 1 show model outputs for regional livestock demand, trade and 
production. Populations and GDP increase across all scenarios, driving a rising demand 
in a number of agricultural products. It has been observed that with increased incomes 
(represented by GDP in the models) individuals adjust their diets, increasing the quality and 
diversity of their food expenditures. Both IMPACT and GLOBIOM assume this relationship 
is true in East Africa, leading to increased demand for animal proteins alongside rising GDP. 
Eastern Africa contributes a relatively small amount of agriculture production to the global 
totals. This fact is important when considering that in the GLOBIOM and IMPACT models 
global trade is represented in different ways. IMPACT considers trade through a global 
market, whereas GLOBIOM models global trade through the integration of multiple regional 
PDUNHWV 7KLV GLIIHUHQW UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ RI JOREDO WUDGH FDQ UHVXOW LQ VLJQL¿FDQW GLIIHUHQFHV LQ 
model outputs from a change in agricultural production. GLOBIOM’s regional approach 
to international trade allows it to capture some of the regional effects on production and 
commodity prices that would occur from the proactive investments of state and non-state 
DFWRUV LQ WKH  VFHQDULRV
For instance, in the Industrious Ants scenario, investments are made in improving yields, 
supporting smallholders and pastoralists, lowering production costs and increasing 
production. In the Herd of Zebra scenario investments are less effective, and in the Lone 
Leopards scenario there is a mix of highly successful and less successful investments with 
an overall emphasis on livestock for urban consumption such as poultry. Sleeping Lions sees 
little to no investments overall, with poultry as an exception. 
1
Figure 31 shows that both models have different assumptions about trade by the region with 
the rest of the world. This is related to the different treatments of land use in the models, 
which translates into different capacities for production as well as the fact that trade is 
organized fundamentally differently between the models: IMPACT is organized around a 
global market while GLOBIOM organizes trade through multi-regional interactions. 
Crop demand, production and trade
Food demand is the main contributor to total demand for cassava and maize in East Africa. 
Food demand in both models is a function of commodity prices and consumers’ income. As 
such, food demand for maize ()LJXUH ) and cassava ()LJXUH ) vary by scenario and over 
time, based on differences in GDP and prices.
Both models show increased production due to investments in productivity. However, these 
increases in production lead to different price effects due to the different ways IMPACT and 
GLOBIOM model prices. IMPACT models global markets and world prices. In commodity 
markets where East Africa contributes a small share of global production, increases in 
regional production have small effects on global prices. GLOBIOM models regional prices, 
therefore, changes in regional production in these same commodity markets will lead to larger 
price effects than in IMPACT. This larger price effect of changes in regional productivity 
explains differences in regional food demand between the two models. For maize, changes in 
regional production in IMPACT lead to limited price effects, whereas in GLOBIOM regional 
production directly affects regional prices leading to increased food demand. For cassava, 
however, changes in regional production do affect global markets in IMPACT, which lead to 
similar food demand trends between the models.
)HHG GHPDQG PDNHV XS D VPDOOHU EXW VLJQL¿FDQW SHUFHQWDJH RI WRWDO GHPDQG IRU FDVVDYD 
(and a small percentage for maize) in East Africa. Feed demand is driven by livestock 
production and by the availability/prices of other feed types. Because of differences between 
WKH WZR PRGHOV FRQFHUQLQJ DQLPDO IHHG HI¿FLHQFLHV WKH WZR VHWV RI VFHQDULRV RXWSXWV DUH 
different. In the GLOBIOM results, the Sleeping Lions scenario shows far less feed demand 
because livestock production is much lower due to an absence of investment. In IMPACT, 
the basic feed demand is higher and there is also a marked peak in the Lone Leopards 
scenario due to investments in large-scale commercial agriculture in that scenario. For maize 
()LJXUH ), feed demand patterns are comparable to those of cassava ()LJXUH ), though the 
magnitude of the demand is less. In the Industrious Ants, Herd of Zebra and Lone Leopards 
scenarios, increasing livestock production leads to increasing demand for all feeds. In 
Sleeping Lions, livestock production is lower and this affects demand.
Calorie availability 
Commodity yields are generally higher in the Industrious Ants scenario due to the broad 
support for agricultural development throughout the period. As discussed previously, 
increased yields results in an increase regional production in both models. In GLOBIOM 
()LJXUH ), the increase in production leads to lower regional prices as well as an increase in 
food demand from consumers. In GLOBIOM, calorie availability per capita is highest for the 
Industrious Ants scenario which, as mentioned earlier, has the most investment in agricultural 
development.
In IMPACT ()LJXUH ), the increase in production for most commodities does not have 
much effect on world prices as the regional share of global production is relatively small. 
Even though increases in regional production do not directly result in an increase in calorie 

availability, the overall growth in GDP per capita results in increased food demand in 
IMPACT. In IMPACT, calorie availability per capita is highest for the scenario with the 
highest GDP growth, Herd of Zebra.
Calorie availability per capita is lowest in the Sleeping Lions scenario for both models. This 
is due, in part, to the low/negative agricultural productivity growth in the scenario over the 
time period (resulting in higher regional prices for consumers) and also the assumed low GDP 
growth.
7KH GLIIHUHQFHV LQ FDORULH DYDLODELOLW\ EHWZHHQ WKH PRGHOV FDQ EH H[SODLQHG LQ WKH ¿JXUHV 
below. GLOBIOM and IMPACT see a slight decrease in the total calories per capita from 
milk during 2010–2020, and by 2030 IMPACT sees a further decline in per capita calories 
from milk while GLOBIOM sees a slight increase in most scenarios. Only in Sleeping Lions 
GR ERWK PRGHOV VKRZ D VLJQL¿FDQW GHFOLQH LQ WKH FDORULHV FRQVXPHG IURP PLON
For the total calories per capita from meat sources, IMPACT shows a relatively constant 
consumption pattern during 2010–2020, except for the Sleeping Lions scenario where there is an 
 SHUFHQW GHFOLQH LQ PHDW FDORULH FRQVXPSWLRQ %\ 00 PHDW FDORULHV LQ ,03$&7 ULVH E\ OHVV 
than 10 percent in all scenarios and decline by nearly 11 percent in the Sleeping Lions scenario. 
GLOBIOM shows a slight increase during 2010–2020 for all scenarios except for Sleeping 
/LRQV DQG WKHQ D PRUH VLJQL¿FDQW LQFUHDVH LQ FRQVXPSWLRQ RI PHDW FDORULHV LQ 00±00
8VLQJ WKH ¿JXUHV EHORZ ZKLFK VKRZ FDORULH FRQVXPSWLRQ SHU FDSLWD ZH FDQ KLJKOLJKW WKH 
differences between scenarios as the combination of the effects of GDP growth and the 
regional changes in production and consumer prices on calorie consumption.
The total food demand for meat (beef, poultry, eggs, pork, sheep and goats) increases 
regionally in both models and is shown in )LJXUH . However, a portion of the increase in 
demand comes from population growth. For this reason, it is important to look at the total 
demand per capita. In GLOBIOM during 2010–2030, the total demand per capita increases 
each period for all scenarios, except the Sleeping Lions. In GLOBIOM, the capita demand for 
milk stays relatively constant throughout the period with a slight decline in 2020, except for 
WKH 6OHHSLQJ /LRQV VFHQDULR ZKHUH WKHUH LV D VLJQL¿FDQW GHFOLQH LQ 010±00 ,Q ,03$&7 
per capita demand for meat is nearly constant during 2010–2020 and then increases only 
slightly in 2030. While GDP per capita increases in each scenario, which generally leads to 
an increase in the per capita demand for meat, the global food demand for meat increases 
at a greater pace over the time period, driving up the global price for meat in IMPACT by 
DERXW 0 SHUFHQW LQ DOO WKH VFHQDULRV 2YHU WKH VDPH WLPH SHULRG WKH JOREDO SULFH RI PLON LQ 
,03$&7 LQFUHDVHV E\ DERXW 0 SHUFHQW LQ DOO WKH VFHQDULRV UHVXOWLQJ LQ DQ RYHUDOO UHJLRQDO 
decline in the per capita demand for milk.
Emissions
An important feature of GLOBIOM is an accounting for the GHG emissions resulting from 
crop and livestock production as well as the emissions resulting from changes in land use such 
as deforestation.  In Figure 60, the main sources of emissions for each scenario are presented. 
For crop production, the main contribution of nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions is through the 
application of fertilizers.  Emissions are calculated for each crop and production system and 
WKHUHIRUH WKH FRQWULEXWLRQ RI HPLVVLRQV UHÀHFW WKH RYHUDOO FKDQJHV LQ WKH W\SH RI SURGXFWLRQ 
and crops being produced. As Figure 61 shows, the N22 DQG PHWKDQH &+ HPLVVLRQV LQ WKH 
Lone Leopards and Sleeping Lions scenarios are highest by 2030. This is explained through 
the underlying expansion of irrigated land that is a main driver in both of those scenarios. The 

shift of crop production between various types of crops as well as the shift among production 
systems over time leads to levels of emissions being quite different between each scenario. 
(PLVVLRQV RI  &+ IURP ULFH SURGXFWLRQ DUH TXLWH VPDOO LQ (DVWHUQ $IULFD ZKHQ FRPSDUHG 
with the rest of the world, but are highest for the Lone Leopards and Sleeping Lions scenarios 
due to the expansion of irrigated agriculture. 
In Eastern Africa, livestock production is the largest contributor to the overall emissions of 
*+*V 7KLV LV GXH WR WKH &+ HPLVVLRQV WKDW FRPH IURP DOO OLYHVWRFN SURGXFWLRQ DV ZHOO 
HPLVVLRQV VSHFL¿FDOO\ DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK WKH ZD\ LQ ZKLFK OLYHVWRFN DUH SURGXFHG )LJXUH  
presents the emissions from livestock production. Although emissions are highest for the 
Industrious Ants and Herd of Zebra scenario, the overall production of livestock is far greater 
(Figures 30 and 36) than in the other scenarios. This means that the emissions per tonne of 
output or per calorie of protein are much lower for the Industrious Ants and Herd of Zebra 
scenarios than for Sleeping Lions and Lone Leopards. Land extensive systems, for example, 
have lower yielding animals which produce more GHG emissions per metric tonne of output 
when compared with more intensive livestock production systems. This means that, while the 
overall emissions may be greater under a certain scenario where livestock production increases, 
the shift of production to more land intensive livestock production systems can reduce the 
emissions per metric tonne of output. A more detailed look at how shifts between livestock 
systems and the resulting effects of GHG emissions is presented by Havlik et al. (2013a).    
Other forms of emissions included in the model include the emissions of CO2 that come 
from deforestation – the process by which forests are cut and converted to crop or livestock 
production. Figure 63 presents the emissions for deforestation which in the region far 
outweigh the GHG emissions from other sources of GHGs. In the Sleeping Lions scenario, 
CO2 emissions resulting from deforestation in 2030 are double that of the emissions from 
the Industrious Ants scenario where the transition from extensive systems to more intensive 
livestock systems dominates. Deforestation is not the only source of emissions from changes 
LQ ODQG XVH DOVR LQFOXGHG LV )LJXUH  ± WKH FRQYHUVLRQ RI RWKHU QDWXUDO ODQGV WR FURS DQG 
livestock producing areas. Industrious Ants and Sleeping Lions see the highest overall CO2 
emissions where there is the most conversion of other natural land to cropland and grassland 
for livestock. Emissions from deforestation and emissions from other land use changes are 
SUHVHQWHG LQ )LJXUH  (PLVVLRQV DUH KLJKHVW RYHU WKH WLPH SHULRG IRU WKH 6OHHSLQJ /LRQV 
scenario which sees an expansion of land for agricultural production and livestock. While the 
emissions in 2020 for the Industrious Ants scenario are higher than the other scenarios due 
to the pressure for increased agricultural production, by 2030, the emissions from land use 
change decline and are in line with those of the other scenarios.
Land-use change 
As discussed in previous sections, land will shift to producing different goods based on the 
RYHUDOO SUR¿WDELOLW\ RI HDFK ODQGXVLQJ VHFWRU 7KH HQYLURQPHQWDO LPSDFWV RI D VKLIW LQ ODQG 
cover from forests to crop or livestock production have been well discussed outside this 
report.  Presented in this section are the direct changes in each sector’s land use resulting from 
the relative productivity in each scenario.
Deforestation is one of the most widely recognizable forms of land use change. The 
transition of forests to cropland, grassland or to managed forests is seen in Figure 66. While 
GHIRUHVWDWLRQ LV VLJQL¿FDQW IRU HDFK VFHQDULR WKURXJKRXW WKH HDUO\ SDUW RI WKH SHULRG E\ 00 
Sleeping Lions sees the highest loss of forests due to expansion in cropland and livestock. 
)LJXUHV  DQG  SUHVHQW WKH DGGLWLRQDO FURSODQG DQG JUDVVODQG IRU HDFK VFHQDULR ZKHUH WKH 
expansion in area for livestock (from forests as well as other natural land) can be seen more 

clearly. The crop area expands at the expense of grassland, forests and other natural land, 
which is largest for the Herd of Zebra and Lone Leopards scenarios.  The shift from low input 
to high input rainfed crop production in the Industrious Ants scenario can explain the need 
IRU D UHODWLYHO\ VPDOO LQFUHDVH LQ FURS DUHD RYHU WKH WLPH SHULRG )LJXUH  7KH DGGLWLRQDO 
crop area over the period for Herd of Zebra is seen as an increase in high and low input 
rainfed area, irrigated area and high input rainfed area for Lone Leopards, and simultaneous 
expansion of the irrigated and low input rainfed crop area in the Sleeping Lions.
,Q )LJXUH  WKH DUHD XQGHU FURS SURGXFWLRQ LV SUHVHQWHG IRU HDFK VFHQDULR RYHU WKH WLPH SHULRG  
$OVR SUHVHQWHG LV WKH GLVWULEXWLRQ RI WKH WRWDO DUHD WR HDFK FURS SURGXFWLRQ V\VWHP DV GH¿QHG 
by GLOBIOM. In the Industrious Ants scenario – that maintains the smallest area under crop 
production but the largest area outside of subsistence agriculture – is dedicated to high input 
rainfed agriculture which has higher yields. For this reason, as presented earlier, this scenario 
enjoys increases in crop production while crop area expansion increases only slightly over the 
time period.  In the Herd of Zebra scenario, this is not the case. While the share of area under 
subsistence agriculture remains relatively constant in proportion to the total area, the share 
of area considered low input rainfed production increases over the time period to more than 
60 percent of the total area under crop production. The Lone Leopards and Sleeping Lions 
scenarios see an increase in the share of area dedicated to irrigated production, while still 
increasing the share of area in low and high input rainfed agriculture. In every scenario except 
Industrious Ants, the overall increase in the total area under crop production grows by more 
than 30 percent over the time period, while in the Industrious Ants scenario total crop area only 
JURZV E\ 1 SHUFHQW RYHU WKH SHULRG ZKLFK KDV VLJQL¿FDQW LPSOLFDWLRQV IRU WKH RWKHU VHFWRUV 
such as forests and natural land as well as land under livestock production.
Land-use change restriction schemes and effects on other outputs
One important message in the storylines was the government’s ability to protect environmental 
health. For the main scenarios presented in the previous sections, this was not included in 
WKH PRGHOOLQJ TXDQWL¿FDWLRQ E\ ,03$&7 RU */2%,20 7R DGGUHVV WKLV LPSRUWDQW LVVXH 
GLOBIOM produced additional scenarios, where a carbon tax on the emissions resulting from 
changes in land use was used to simulate a government action to protect the environment. These 
supplemental scenarios included a carbon tax resulting from emissions related to the change 
of land from forest to cropland or pasture land, or from natural land to crop or pasture land. To 
better capture the storyline of the Industrious Ants and Herd of Zebra scenarios, a tax on all 
HPLVVLRQV UHVXOWLQJ IURP FKDQJHV LQ ODQG XVH ZDV LPSRVHG VHW DW  86' 0 SHU PHJDWRQQH 0W 
of CO2 HTXLYDOHQW DQG 86' 10 SHU 0W RI &22 equivalent, respectively. In the Lone Leopards 
scenario, only a tax on emissions resulting from deforestation was imposed, and for the Sleeping 
Lions scenario we applied no carbon tax on emissions resulting from the changes in land use, 
since governments are slow to react to the protecting the environment. 
)LJXUH 0 SUHVHQWV WKH GHIRUHVWDWLRQ XQGHU WKH HPLVVLRQV WD[ VFKHPHV :KLOH GHIRUHVWDWLRQ 
occurs up to 2010, after the tax is imposed, the level of deforestation falls in all scenarios except 
Sleeping Lions, where there is no emissions tax. Land is still converted to cropland as is seen in 
)LJXUH 1 DQG ZKHUH WKHUH LV RQO\ D WD[ RQ WKH HPLVVLRQV IURP GHIRUHVWDWLRQ /RQH /HRSDUGV 
the conversion to cropland from other sources still occurs, but is much lower than the land 
FRQYHUVLRQ XQGHU WKH QRUPDO VFHQDULRV )LJXUH   7KH FRQYHUVLRQ RI ODQG IURP SULVWLQH IRUHVWV 
and other natural land to grasslands also still occurs under the emissions policies scenarios 
)LJXUH  KRZHYHU ZKHQ FRPSDUHG ZLWK WKH QRUPDO VFHQDULRV )LJXUH  WKH DGGLWLRQDO 
JUDVVODQG LV VLJQL¿FDQWO\ OHVV ,QWHUHVWLQJO\ WKH +HUG RI =HEUD VFHQDULR VHHV WKH PRVW UHGXFWLRQ 
in land converted to grassland when compared with the normal scenarios.  

Protection of the environment at the expense of food security would be an undesirable 
RXWFRPH EXW )LJXUHV ± VKRZ WKDW WKHUH LV QR VLJQL¿FDQW GHFOLQH LQ FDORULHV DYDLODEOH 
XQGHU WKH ODQGXVH FKDQJH /8& UHVWULFWLRQV  
Figure 30. Regional beef production across the 4 scenarios from 2010 to 2030 as 
simulated by GLOBIOM and IMPACT.
Figure 29. Regional demand for beef across the 4 scenarios from 2010 to 2030 as 
simulated by GLOBIOM and IMPACT.

Figure 31. Net trade for beef across the 4 scenarios from 2010 to 2030 as simulated by 
GLOBIOM and IMPACT.
Figure 32. Regional demand for poultry, simulated across 4 scenarios for 2010, 2020 
and 2030 with IMPACT and GLOBIOM.

Figure 33. Regional poultry production across the 4 scenarios from 2010 to 2030 as 
simulated by GLOBIOM and IMPACT.
Figure 34. Regional trade in poultry across the 4 scenarios from 2010 to 2030 as 
simulated by GLOBIOM and IMPACT.

Figure 35. Regional demand for sheep and goat meat, simulated across 4 scenarios for 
2010, 2020 and 2030 with IMPACT and GLOBIOM.
Figure 36. Regional production of sheep and goat meat, simulated across 4 scenarios for 
2010, 2020 and 2030 with IMPACT and GLOBIOM.

Figure 37. Regional trade of sheep and goat meat, simulated across 4 scenarios for 
2010, 2020 and 2030 with IMPACT and GLOBIOM. 
Figure 38. Regional milk demand across 4 scenarios for 2010, 2020 and 2030 as 
simulated by GLOBIOM and IMPACT.
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Figure 39. Regional milk production across 4 scenarios for 2010, 2020 and 2030 as 
simulated by GLOBIOM and IMPACT.
Figure 40. Regional milk trade across 4 scenarios for 2010, 2020 and 2030 as simulated 
by GLOBIOM and IMPACT.
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Figure 41. Food demand across 4 scenarios for cassava in 2010, 2020 and 2030 as 
simulated by GLOBIOM and IMPACT. 
Figure 42. Feed demand across 4 scenarios for cassava 2010, 2020 and 2030 as 
simulated by GLOBIOM and IMPACT.
62
Figure 43. Production across 4 scenarios for cassava 2010, 2020 and 2030 as simulated 
by GLOBIOM and IMPACT. 
Figure 44. Net trade for East Africa across 4 scenarios for cassava 2010, 2020 and 2030 
as simulated by GLOBIOM and IMPACT. 
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Figure 45. Food demand across 4 scenarios for maize in 2010, 2020 and 2030 as 
simulated by GLOBIOM and IMPACT. 
Figure 46. Feed demand across 4 scenarios for maize in 2010, 2020 and 2030 as 
simulated by GLOBIOM and IMPACT.

Figure 47. Production across 4 scenarios for maize in 2010, 2020 and 2030 as simulated 
by GLOBIOM and IMPACT. 
Figure 48. Regional net trade across 4 scenarios for maize in 2010, 2020 and 2030 as 
simulated by GLOBIOM and IMPACT. 

Figure 49. Total calorie consumption per capita (from milk).
Figure 50. Total calories per capita (from meat) beef, poultry, eggs, pork, sheep and 
goats.
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Figure 51. Total demand for beef, eggs, pork, poultry, sheep and goats.
Figure 52. Total food demand per capita for beef, eggs, pork, poultry, sheep and goats.

Figure 53. Total demand per capita for milk. 
Figure 54. Total demand for milk.

Figure 55. Total food demand for crop and livestock products.
Figure 56. Total demand for main food staples cassava, wheat, maize, sorghum, millet, 
sweet potatoes, and potatoes. 

Figure 57. Total demand per capita for main food staples cassava, wheat, maize, 
sorghum, millet, sweet potatoes, and potatoes. 
Figure 58. Total calorie availability per capita per day from all sources up to 2030 – 
from GLOBIOM results.
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Figure 59. Total calorie availability per capita per day from all sources up to 2030 from 
IMPACT results.
Figure 60. Emissions (Mt per year) from GLOBIOM.
1
Figure 61. Emissions of CH4 and N2O from crop production only (Mt CO2 equivalent per 
year) from GLOBIOM.
Figure 62. Emissions from livestock production (Mt per year) from GLOBIOM.

Figure 63. Emissions from deforestation (conversion of forest land to crop and livestock) 
(Mt CO2 per year) from GLOBIOM.
Figure 64. CO2 emissions from conversion of other natural land to crop and livestock 
production (Mt CO2 per year) from GLOBIOM.

Figure 65. Emissions from all land use change including deforestation (Mt CO2 per year) 
from GLOBIOM.
Figure 66. Total deforestation per 1000 ha (conversion of forest land to crop, livestock 
or from pristine forests to managed forests) from GLOBIOM.

Figure 67. Total additional cropland area per 1000 ha (cropland converted from 
grassland, forest, or other natural vegetation) from GLOBIOM.
Figure 68. Total additional grassland area (grassland converted from forests and other 
natural land) from GLOBIOM.

Figure 69. Total area by crop production system from GLOBIOM.
Figure 70. Deforestation under the LUC tax scenarios (forests converted to cropland, 
grassland, or managed forests) with different emissions from LUC tax regimes for the 
scenarios: USD 50 per hectare for Industrious Ants, USD 10 per hectare for Herd of 
Zebra, USD 50 per hectare only applied to deforestation for Lone Leopards and no LUC 
emissions tax for Sleeping Lions. From GLOBIOM.
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Figure 71. Additional cropland (land converted from grassland or pristine forests) LUC 
tax regimes for the scenarios: USD 50 per hectare for Industrious Ants, USD 10 per 
hectare for Herd of Zebra, USD 50 per hectare only applied to deforestation for Lone 
Leopards and no LUC emissions tax for Sleeping Lions. From GLOBIOM.
Figure 72. Additional grassland under the LUC tax scenarios from GLOBIOM.

Figure 73. Calorie availability with different LUC tax regimes for the scenarios: USD 50 
per hectare for Industrious Ants, USD 10 per hectare for Herd of Zebra, USD 50 per 
hectare only applied to deforestation for Lone Leopards and no LUC emissions tax for 
Sleeping Lions. From GLOBIOM.
Figure 74. Animal calories under LUC restrictions from GLOBIOM.

Figure 75. Total vegetable calories under LUC restrictions from GLOBIOM.
Figure 76. Milk calories under LUC restrictions from GLOBIOM.

Discussion
Key results and insights from the scenarios 
The large amount of qualitative, semi-quantitative and quantitative results associated with 
the CCAFS East Africa scenarios yield a number of insights for the future of the region 
that are summarized here.
The quantitative analyses indicate that, even with highly proactive policies, global market 
SUHVVXUHV DQG FKDQJLQJ SRSXODWLRQV ZLOO PDNH LW GLI¿FXOW WR LPSURYH XSRQ WKH FXUUHQW 
level of food availability. Therefore, if increasing calorie availability through increasing 
production or decreasing demand, food policies should be looking into food access and 
how the food insecure are able to become more food secure. Price supports when shocks 
occur could be considered. Cost-reducing policies that look at infrastructure can help 
increase the ease of import as well as enabling food producers to reach markets easier. 
Growing populations (the same across all scenarios) and GDP (different for each 
scenario) drive demand for many food products. In particular, demand for poultry and 
milk increases with changing consumption patterns due to increases in income (often in 
urban contexts) in the region. 
Foreign investments can either further damage or transform food security in East Africa, 
depending on how they are managed by regional actors. Investment can contribute to 
GDP and yields, or can drive displacement of rural populations toward marginal areas.
In all scenarios – even the more environmentally friendly scenarios – food security and 
livelihoods take precedence over policies for environmental health.
It is, however, possible to minimize the degradation of ecosystems and still moderately 
LQFUHDVH UHJLRQDO IRRG DYDLODELOLW\ DV WKH /8& WD[ YHUVLRQV RI WKH VFHQDULRV VKRZ 7KH 
*/2%,20 UHVXOWV LQGLFDWH WKDW /8& WD[HV WULJJHU SURGXFWLRQ LQWR D WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ 
toward higher intensity production. The taxes would have issues of implementation, 
however (since the models assume perfect implementation) and governments may have 
FRQÀLFWLQJ LQWHUHVWV LQ PDNLQJ UHYHQXH IURP WKH ODQG XVH WD[ DQG FRQVHUYDWLRQ
3DVWRUDOLVWV IDFH GLI¿FXOW SURVSHFWV LQ DOO IXWXUH VFHQDULRV HYHQ LQ ,QGXVWULRXV $QWV ZKHUH 
their livelihoods are protected for a time and will move to other sources of income. 
Confronting challenges around land availability and labour intensity, they may be moving 
to urban areas. These ex-pastoralists may be among the most food insecure in the cities.
In all of the scenarios, East Africa’s demand outstrips production due to increasing 
populations and GDP to different degrees. This means that in all the scenarios, East 
Africa will be importing many commodities. Because of this, how East Africa interacts 
with global markets will be crucial in the future, to different degrees depending on the 
scenario. 
In all East African scenarios, there is a tendency towards increased mixed and intensive 
agriculture and livestock among small-scale farmers.  
Using the scenarios: key results
The East Africa scenarios were used in normative back-casting, with both state actors 
(policy advisors from different departments, representatives of regional governance 
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bodies the EAC and the Lake Victoria Basin Commission) and non-state actors (civil 
society, NGO, representatives of farmers’ and agricultural entrepreneurs’ associations). 
In each workshop, participants – largely unfamiliar with the East Africa scenarios since 
WKHVH ZHUH GHYHORSHG E\ RWKHUV ± ZHUH ¿UVW DVNHG WR PDNH WKHLU QRUPDWLYH JRDOV IRU IXWXUH 
food security and environments explicit, as well as to outline what they perceived as their 
future challenges in reaching these goals through their own organizations. 
Then the participants were divided in groups across the scenarios. They were asked 
WR UHYLHZ WKH VFHQDULRV RQ 1 SODXVLELOLW\ DQG  UHOHYDQFH WR SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ GHFLVLRQ 
making contexts, as well as to adapt them to increase these criteria and link the scenarios 
WR WKHLU SUHYLRXVO\ LGHQWL¿HG FKDOOHQJHV )ROORZLQJ WKLV SDUWLFLSDQWV UHH[DPLQHG WKHLU 
normative goals and translated these broader goals into new goals they could personally 
contribute to achieving. Afterwards each of the groups assigned to scenarios were asked 
to back-cast from these goals (in 2030) to determine what previous steps were needed (in 
0 00 DQG IXUWKHU EDFNZDUGV WR DFKLHYH WKHP +RZHYHU WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI WKHVH 
backward pathways did not happen in a vacuum, but in an adaptive fashion with regard 
to contextual challenges and opportunities offered by each scenario. Then, the pathways 
developed in the context of different scenarios were evaluated in terms of their feasibility 
in other scenarios. In some cases, pathways developed in scenarios with more favourable 
conditions than others were not transferrable. In most cases, though, core ideas could be 
implemented across multiple scenarios, but the pathways to achieve them would have to 
be different – resulting in an analysis of a range of feasible pathways toward improved 
food security and environmental change depending on the need to adapt to different future 
conditions. 
The outcomes from these two workshops were different but complementary. The non-
state actors focused on how to realize practical interventions for increased food security 
and environmental wellbeing. The four different scenarios offered different enabling or 
limiting governance environments for these non-state actors to work with. Conversely, 
the policy advisors mainly focused on how to change the governance environments in 
the scenarios to create a more enabling space for interventions, complementary to the 
outcomes of the non-state actors’ workshop. 
$V DQ H[DPSOH IURP WKH QRQVWDWH DFWRUV ZRUNVKRS )LJXUH  LQ WKH /RQH /HRSDUGV 
scenario (fractured status quo and proactive governance of food security, environments 
and livelihoods, see )LJXUH 1), national-level, information technology-enabled tree 
management pathways were developed that did not engage regional bodies. Instead, they 
included the involvement of various individually cooperative governments and consortia 
with NGOs/CSOs to work with local communities and, at the same time, strengthen 
geographic information systems and other IT-based research to guide tree management. 
In the Industrious Ants scenario – characterized by stronger regional integration – 
pathways could be developed that directly engaged regional funding and research, while 
in the Sleeping Lions scenario – characterised by a lack of regional integration as well 
as reactive governance – governments could not be counted on for support and a more 
bottom-up pathway was required. 
In the state actors’ workshop, conversely, the greater focus on changing the governance 
environment led to very different pathways. An important takeaway from this workshop 
ZDV UHFRJQL]LQJ EHQH¿WV WR UHJLRQDO SROLF\ WKURXJK WKH LQFOXVLRQ RI IDUPHUV LQ SROLF\ 
PDNLQJ 7KHVH EHQH¿WV ZHUH SHUFHLYHG LQ DOO WKH VFHQDULRV FRQVLGHUHG UHJDUGOHVV RI 
whether the reviewed policies focused on improving food security, the environment 
or livelihoods. An outcome of the workshop was therefore that the policy advisors 
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recommended a shift of the role of the East African Farmers’ Federation from observers in 
policy processes at the EAC to having a role in agenda-setting.
Reports from all participants in both workshops state that they were successful in enhancing 
the abilities of the participants to think more strategically about future adaptive pathways, 
as well as for all involved to grasp the cross-sectoral and cross-country dialogues and 
partnerships needed to tackle regional food systems and food security issues. 
An example of participants’ immediate use of the workshop outcomes included an 
HQYLURQPHQWDO RI¿FHU RI WKH ($& UHSRUWLQJ WKDW VKH WRRN WKH IROORZLQJ PHVVDJHV LQWR WKH 
EAC budget planning meeting that followed the scenarios workshop. 
As played out in the Herd of Zebra scenario, the failure of governments to invest in food 
security and the environment would have severe negative long-term consequences on both – 
she recognized that this particular scenario was in fact the one that current national policies 
were leading towards.
As long as governments within the regions failed to work closely with the private sector and 
civil society actors, they would continue to have a limited ability to initiate positive change, 
such as enhancing regional food security. 
Figure 77. Summary of a strategy from the non-state actors’ normative back-casting in 
the Lone Leopards scenario and how this strategy would have to be adapted to tackle 
the challenges and opportunities of the other three scenarios. The text in capital letters 
provides example challenges/opportunities – the sentence case text shows steps in 
diverse pathways.
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Generally, the advisors and other (non-state) participants said that the use of the scenarios in a 
back-casting process helped them to: 
 Take an integrated systems perspective on the future of East Africa. 
 Get a better understanding of the future challenges for food security, livelihoods and 
environments in East Africa and how to design strategies to address these challenges.
 /HDUQ DERXW QHZ UHJLRQDO OLQNDJHV DQG ¿QG RXW ZKDW DFWLYLWLHV DUH EHLQJ GRQH LQ 
other countries – recognizing the need for more interaction between organizations in 
different sectors and different countries. 
 See the need for collaboration between state and non-state actors facilitated by 
regional bodies. 
Participants said they thought the model outputs were tangible and practical and would be 
useful at the regional, national and local levels. In particular, they felt the outputs would be 
useful and credible tools for planners and decision makers seeking legitimate information 
before making choices. After working with the scenarios they found them to be highly 
plausible. Participants said they will take back what they have learnt to their ministries or 
agencies and they were keen to advocate the use of scenarios in their planning processes.
A large and diverse set of policy options for state and non-state actors emerged from 
the workshops as being feasible in most or all future scenarios. Most of these featured 
collaborations between different national agriculture, environment and planning ministries, 
regional civil society and private sector platforms in the food security and environment 
sectors together with the EAC and the Lake Victoria Basin Committee. The policy options 
also linked to ongoing CCAFS research. Examples are: 
 Supporting the East Africa Farmers Federation (EAFF) to have a more proactive 
and stronger voice in agricultural and food security policy processes, beyond being 
observers of EAC policy formulation, in order to more effectively serve their member 
farmers. This was supported by participants from agricultural ministries and other CSOs. 
 Setting up a permanent scenarios/strategic futures unit that reports to the EAFF and 
EAC and provides continuous strategic insight at the regional level in the same way 
that the CCAFS scenarios process has done. 
 Exchange programmes between East African agriculture ministries on:
 ƕ )DUPHUV¶ VFKRROV DQG DVVRFLDWLRQV ¿UVW RUJDQL]H H[FKDQJH SURJUDPPHV EHWZHHQ 
ministries themselves and then between the farmers’ associations involved in the 
programmes. This links to the CCAFS Farms of the Future exchange programme 
(http://ccafs.cgiar.org/our-work/research-themes/progressive-adaptation/farms-
future).
 ƕ Knowledge exchange about indigenous, alternative, climate-resilient crops 
between the ministries. 
 ƕ Exchange to learn about urban/peri-urban agriculture programmes between the 
different EAC countries. 
 Developing more inclusive, multi-sector climate communication outlets between the 
DJULFXOWXUH PLQLVWULHV WKH JRYHUQPHQW PHWHRURORJLFDO RI¿FHV DQG WKH UHJLRQDO PHGLD 
attending the workshop as well as linking to ongoing CCAFS efforts.
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 A tree planting scheme between the agriculture ministries, the environmental 
ministries, the private sector and CCAFS. 
 A proposal to the EAC to organize a regional ombudsperson to help ensure more 
transparent institutions.
 Linking existing Early Warning Systems for food security to regional food reserve 
planning.
 A West Wing type television series portraying a young dynamic woman leader of a 
vibrant East African federation – similar to the ongoing efforts featuring agricultural 
UHVHDUFKHUV ZLWKLQ WKH UHJLRQ VKDULQJ WKHLU VFLHQWL¿F NQRZOHGJH ZLWK D YDVW (DVW 
African rural TV audience through a farm reality show called Shamba Shape-up.
Other general themes of the policy imperatives, options and opportunities discussed in the 
workshops included investments and efforts towards improving institutional transparency 
and accountability, media empowerment, civic education, gender roles, agricultural markets 
infrastructure, alternative energy sources, infrastructure in rural areas to reduce migration, 
food quality and safety standards and the independence of environmental agencies. 
Participants thought that the policy options that came up in the workshops were realistic 
DQG LPSOHPHQWDEOH WKRXJK VRPH ZRXOG QHHG PRUH DWWHQWLRQ DQG VXSSRUW IURP WRS RI¿FLDOV 
and additional work to encourage widespread buy-in to these new processes, as well as 
DSSURSULDWH ¿QDQFLDO UHVRXUFHV 7KH\ DOVR UHSRUWHG KDYLQJ HVWDEOLVKHG NH\ SDUWQHUVKLSV 
with people in similar roles in other countries, as well as with people from the Society for 
International Development East Africa, CCAFS and Panos East Africa to consider how to take 
these policy options forward.
Now, to turn these robust policy options into realities, CCAFS and its partners the Society for 
International Development and Panos are facilitating the further development of collaborative 
SODQV EHWZHHQ WKH PLQLVWULHV UHJLRQDO ERGLHV DQG QRQVWDWH DFWRUV LGHQWL¿HG LQ WKH VFHQDULRV 
process. The initial focus for these continued engagements will be on: 1) changing the role of 
WKH ($)) LQ UHJLRQDO SROLF\  VHWWLQJ XS D UHJLRQDO VWUDWHJLF IXWXUHV XQLW IRU RQJRLQJ VXSSRUW 
WR WKH ($)) WKH ($& DQG RWKHU UHJLRQDO ERGLHV  KHOSLQJ WR GHYHORS NQRZOHGJH H[FKDQJH 
links between government agricultural, environmental and planning ministries and between 
JRYHUQPHQWV LQ WKH UHJLRQ DQG  HQVXULQJ WKH XVHIXOQHVV RI WKH VFHQDULRV SURFHVV IRU QDWLRQDO 
and sub-national decision making. Thus, we are seeing encouraging signs of new joint efforts 
being made to tackle the complex challenges of agricultural development and food security in 
the face of many changes, including that of a changing climate.
Using regional scenarios in local futures and vice versa
The regional scenarios and normative back-casting described in this paper are being used in 
a range of local strategic futures activities, 2 examples of which are discussed below. The 
interaction between the regional scenarios and local-level futures works both ways: regional 
scenarios can inform local adaptation pathways, and outcomes can be used to inform and 
enrich the scenarios and, by extension, regional adaptive pathways.
Local-level scenarios and normative back-casting in a national context
A CCAFS local-to-national level research project, Systemic Integrated Adaptation (SIA), 
LGHQWL¿HV DQG DQDO\VHV WKH OLQNV EHWZHHQ WKH UHVLOLHQFH DQG DGDSWLYH FDSDFLW\ RI VPDOOKROGHU 
farmers on the ground and the broader social, economic, political and environmental systems 
in which they are embedded in Africa and South Asia. The programme itself is multi-level, 
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involving a mixture of intra-community through to national level studies. The regional 
scenarios processes appraised in this paper are used to provide exploratory examples of 
how these broader systems might evolve. The regional scenarios are used within the SIA 
framework to explore what elements farmers might need to adapt to and, through normative 
back-casting, which adaptation strategies and pathways might be supported or undermined 
in those broader systems in different scenarios. The combination of regional socio-economic 
scenarios and climate change scenarios serve as different contexts through which the 
robustness of back-casted adaptation and development actions is tested. Conversely, the 
contextual data generated through the integrated multi-level studies in SIA informs the 
regional level work. 
Participatory household-level modelling
The results of the regional scenarios are being used to provide context for much higher-
resolution ex-ante modelling, at the levels of the household, community and landscape, linked 
to stakeholder inputs at that level. While regional modelling efforts informed by regional 
stakeholders provide aggregated information of the evolution of food systems, household 
modelling can help in identifying and evaluating different adaptation pathways that work for 
KHWHURJHQHRXV W\SHV RI IDUPLQJ V\VWHPV $W WKH KRXVHKROG OHYHO VFHQDULRVSHFL¿F FRPPRGLW\ 
prices and land-use patterns are used to evaluate the impacts of different future pathways 
for food security, incomes and key environmental indicators in different types of farming 
systems. 
For example, substantial increases in regional production and price of commodities such 
DV PLON LQ WKH FRPLQJ GHFDGHV PD\ KDYH VLJQL¿FDQW LPSDFWV RQ FURSSLQJ SDWWHUQV DQG IDUP 
incomes of smallholder households in some of the mixed crop–livestock systems of central 
.HQ\D +HUUHUR HW DO 01 (YDOXDWLRQ RI RSWLRQV DW PXOWLSOH OHYHOV KHOSV WR LGHQWLI\ 
where social welfare outcomes are at odds with private producer outcomes. In addition, 
VFHQDULREDVHG KRXVHKROG PRGHOOLQJ FDQ UH¿QH WKH SDUDPHWHULVDWLRQ RI UHJLRQDO VFHQDULRV 
SURYLGLQJ UHDOLW\ FKHFNV RQ WKH SODXVLELOLW\ RI NH\ DVVXPSWLRQV VXFK DV WKH H[WHQW RI /8&V 
in a particular agricultural system or appropriate changes in stocking rates. A wide variety 
of different household models are being used for multiple-level analyses, ranging from 
VLPSOH PDWKHPDWLFDO SURJUDPPLQJ RSWLPLVDWLRQ PRGHOV 5X¿QR HW DO VXEPLWWHG 7KRUQWRQ 
et al. 2011) to models built on systems dynamics and agent-based approaches (Van Wijk et 
al. 2012). 
Links to global futures research
7KH ,3&&OHG VFLHQWL¿F FRPPXQLW\ KDV ¿QDOL]HG D VHW RI ¿YH JOREDO 6KDUHG 6RFLRHFRQRPLF 
Pathways (SSPs), complementary to new climate scenarios or Representative Concentration 
Pathways (Moss et al. 2010). Simultaneously, several working groups have been created 
whose main task it is to enrich the basic set of SSPs. A working group on ‘Nested scenarios 
across geographies and time’ has also been created. This working group will assess 
possibilities to downscale the global SSPs, taking into account both the geographical 
VSHFL¿FLWLHV DQG WKH XVXDOO\ KLJKHU WHPSRUDO UHVROXWLRQV WKDW DUH FRQVLGHUHG DW UHJLRQDO OHYHO 
Part of the team involved in the regional scenarios described here is also involved in the 
development of the SSPs, enabling a cross-level comparison. This comparison, done so far 
for the East Africa scenario shows that though they have been developed separately from the 
663V WKH VFHQDULRV QRQHWKHOHVV ¿W WKH 663 IUDPHZRUN WR D GHJUHH 7KH VFHQDULRV DOVR GLIIHU 
substantially from the SSPs in that they offer more information and linked dynamics across 
dimensions and describe regional tensions, challenges and opportunities not perceived at the 
global level. 
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Discussion 
5HÁHFWLQJ RQ WKH VFHQDULRV GHYHORSPHQW SURFHVV
Scenarios methodology is suitable for taking a food systems (rather than an agricultural 
production) approach to future food security challenges, because it aims to surface and 
challenge assumptions about actors’ wider contexts, instead of limiting itself to their 
LPPHGLDWH GHFLVLRQ VSDFH :LONLQVRQ DQG (LGLQRZ 00 7KH (DVW $IULFD VFHQDULRV SURFHVV 
presented in this working paper is an example of this. At the regional level, it incorporates 
broad socio-economic and political/governance dynamics and explores how these interact 
with multiple aspects such as food security, environmental change and livelihoods. 
However, this broad exploration offers many challenges related to available expertise and 
GDWD ,W KDV SURYHQ GLI¿FXOW HVSHFLDOO\ LQLWLDOO\ WR DFFHVV DQ DSSURSULDWH GLYHUVLW\ RI H[SHUWLVH 
to inform the futures work, especially when the need for diverse knowledge on food systems 
and environmental change is combined with the need for participants from different sectors 
(e.g. governments, civil society) and countries. Initially, the scenarios process in East Africa 
already engaged various stakeholder groups, but as the required scope of the scenarios 
became clear, participants in the process highlighted the need for more diverse engagement 
across sectors and disciplines, including those not directly connected to food security and 
environments but rather connected to external drivers of change, such as the development of 
economies and infrastructure and political stability – and the CCAFS scenarios team extended 
the stakeholder involvement. 
Similarly, data availability and compatibility also become challenging with such a broad 
VFRSH ,Q RXU FDVH WKH VFHQDULRV KDYH EHHQ TXDQWL¿HG E\ PRGHOV WKDW WRJHWKHU DUH RQO\ DEOH 
WR GHDO ZLWK D VXEVHW RI WKH RXWFRPHV RI LQWHUHVW PDLQO\ DJULFXOWXUH EDVLF IRRG VHFXULW\ /8& 
and emissions. Outcomes related to livelihoods and food quality, for example, have to be 
addressed in other ways such as the local household modelling.
Linking regional and global scenarios has been demonstrated to be feasible, but still remains 
a challenge. A single global scenario is currently assumed as a context for the East and West 
African scenarios. However, what happens to these scenarios when the role of China and 
India changes? Currently, if we take the example of the East African scenarios, each of these 
¿WV DQ 663 VFHQDULR UHODWLYHO\ ZHOO +RZHYHU H[SHULPHQWLQJ ZLWK GLIIHUHQW FRPELQDWLRQV RI 
global and regional scenarios could provide many new insights. The IPCC SSPs (Moss et 
al. 2010) invite links to global scenarios but these scenarios are not altered by insights at the 
sub-continental level. To further develop possibilities for global links, the scenarios outputs 
are used by the Global Foresight Hub of the Global Forum on Agricultural Research (GFAR 
2012) – a global network of food-related futures work and practitioners, as an ongoing 
example for the network (Vervoort and Ericksen 2012). As the CCAFS scenario planning 
process in East Africa and in future regions develops, it will be possible to conduct a global-
level analysis of contextual challenges and opportunities and adaptation pathways across the 
developing world, based in the perspectives of regional actors. This can provide key learning 
between developing world regions as well as providing developing world perspectives on 
uncertain drivers and adaptation pathways for global development organizations.
5HÁHFWLRQV RQ WKH VFHQDULRV XVH SURFHVV
The examples from the state and non-state actors workshops in East Africa show that the 
combination of explorative scenarios and normative back-casting allows for the sense-
making process of developing scenarios to have an assessable role in guiding adaptive 
decision-pathways. The use of this combinatory process with different groups can create 

complementary types of pathways which can be linked and used to link stakeholder groups. 
The emergence of such outcomes also highlights that there is a long way to go from 
FRQFHLYLQJ DGDSWDWLRQ SDWKZD\V WR UHÀH[LYH DSSOLFDWLRQ
In the scenarios development process, participants were continually involved between the 
meetings, helping to generate credible, legitimate and salient scenarios. In the normative 
back-casting phase, however, ongoing engagement is essential for another purpose – to help 
apply the outcomes from the back-casting work into actions contributing to new pathways 
6HOVN\ DQG 3DUNHU 00 $ FRQWLQXDO HQJDJHPHQW PRGHO 5HLG HW DO 00 EH\RQG WKH 
meetings is key –  workshops (over several days) are not necessarily the most effective 
approach for engaging the highest level decision makers, who are in the best position to turn 
the ideas generated into actions. Having experienced some limits to the workshop model 
in East Africa, a key ongoing role of a boundary organization (such as SID) is to continue 
to strengthen partnerships and turn proposed pathways from state and non-state actors into 
actions. Strategies such as breakfast meetings between the boundary organizations and 
participants willing to act as policy champions with higher level policy makers are pursued. 
Building long-term partnerships through continual engagement also helps to understand 
which stakeholders are critical to affect change towards more adaptive decision making and to 
build relationships with those who are willing to act as policy champions in interactions with 
top national and regional decision makers. Local partners who are familiar with structures 
to engage decision makers are best placed to strengthen these links. Another approach that 
supports a continual engagement model involves training regional experts beyond being 
veterans of a scenarios process to being able to facilitate futures processes, thus helping 
WR EXLOG UHJLRQDO VWUDWHJLF FDSDFLW\ 5HLG HW DO 00 ,Q DGGLWLRQ WR WDUJHWHG HQJDJHPHQW 
various outputs with regional communication and media specialists (cartoons, briefs, 
EORJV ¿OPV 79 HSLVRGHV DUH EHLQJ FUHDWHG WR HQJDJH ZLGHU DXGLHQFHV DQG LQYLWH IXUWKHU 
collaboration (Vervoort et al. 2010).
The adaptations and translations done for the use of the scenarios in normative back-casting 
with different groups mean that there are essentially different versions of the scenarios, 
though structured by the same basic assumptions. This willingness to adapt the scenarios and 
provide scenarios use as a service has enabled such system links to be initiated. However, 
while the adaptation of the scenarios has provided new critical perspectives on the scenarios, 
these have yet to be compared and integrated to enrich the scenarios. In addition, the 
possibility of linking the scenarios to monitoring and tracking via horizon-scanning and the 
GHYHORSPHQW RI HDUO\ ZDUQLQJ V\VWHPV KDV \HW WR EH GHYHORSHG :LONLQVRQ DQG (LGLQRZ 00 
Wilkinson and Ramirez 2010). This would be a valuable direction to develop to attend to the 
IXWXUH LQ D UHÀH[LYH IDVKLRQ DQG WR DYRLG FRQWULEXWLQJ WR D IDOVH VHQVH RI VHFXULW\ =XUHN DQG 
+HQULFKV 00 DQG ORFNLQJ LQWR WKH SUHVHQW
General conclusions
Scenarios offer a way to make sense of complex systems characterized by high uncertainty. 
Food systems and their interactions with global environmental and socio-economic change 
are a typical example of this. In multi-stakeholder contexts, scenarios offer a tool for sharing 
perspectives on the future and agree on the need for shared action. Planning processes that use 
both exploratory scenarios and adaptive planning through normative back-casting especially 
exhibit potential to guide collaborative sense- and decision-making across system levels and 
dimensions. Planning processes that do not incorporate multiple potential futures still operate 
under the assumptions of an unacknowledged scenario, and may have limited value in the 
face of a highly uncertain future. This includes processes that use normative back-casting 

exclusively without applying that method in the context of multiple scenarios. Conversely, 
futures processes that use only scenarios may not help in developing appropriate adaptive 
pathways. Normative back-casting can help stakeholders explore how to act in challenging 
future conditions and consider how the pathways developed through back-casting can inform 
their planning.
The CCAFS program and its partners have created socio-economic scenarios for the future of 
East Africa up to 2030 together with a wide range of stakeholders. These scenarios provide 
qualitative, semi-quantitative and quantitative information about each plausible future. Each 
of these futures offers a different set of challenges and opportunities for decision makers. 
$GGLWLRQDOO\ WRJHWKHU WKH  VFHQDULRV SURYLGH LQVLJKWV LQWR FRPPRQ WKHPHV FKDOOHQJHV 
and opportunities for the future of the region. The models used provide complementary 
and comparable results but are also limited in their ability to capture all dimensions of the 
scenarios. Qualitative and semi-quantitative information based on stakeholder consultation 
provides guidelines. 
The CCAFS regional scenarios for East Africa have been used successfully in planning 
processes with state and non-state actors – and the results of these processes have been a 
number of proposals for collaborative, strategic action to improve food security, environments 
DQG OLYHOLKRRGV LQ WKH UHJLRQ WDNLQJ LQWR DFFRXQW VLJQL¿FDQW VRFLRHFRQRPLF XQFHUWDLQWLHV DQG 
how these interact with climate change. 
More work is needed to turn these proposals into real action. CCAFS performs a guiding 
role in this process. Continual engagement and embedding of the future-oriented work in the 
region is vital for this phase to succeed. 
In addition to guiding planning at the regional and national levels, the scenarios generated 
for East Africa also seek to inform local-level planning and research as well as global futures 
work in research and decision making. 

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